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The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical
Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy
James Thuo Gathii*
While the Chief Justice's dissent says there are 'weapons [such as
cartels or boycotts] in the arsenals offoreign nations' sufficient to
enable them to counter anticompetitive conduct ... such ...
political remed[ies are] hardly available to a foreign nation faced
with the monopolistic control of the supply of medicines needed
for the health and safety of its people. I
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two distinct, albeit mutually reinforcing, stances within U.S.
foreign policy on HIV/AIDS. The first of these stances favors strong
international pharmaceutical patent protection, unencumbered by any
restrictions, as the best alternative to ensuring availability of drugs to treat
those infected with HIV/AIDS. 2  Unlike the first stance that is
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Mary Wood and Linda Murray for their help. To Oko Akwei and Kohei Higo, thanks for your
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this article to Agnes Njoki Kirera.
1. Pfizer Inc. v India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978) (Stewart, J.). In this case, the governments of
India, Iran and the Philippines, among others, sought damages against Pfizer for engaging in price
fixing, market division and fraud against the U.S. Patent Office with respect to a broad range of
antibiotics. Id. at 310. The Court had to decide whether it could treat a sovereign nation the same
way it did citizens under the Sherman Act. Id. at 312. The Court decided in the affirmative with
Chief Justice Burger, Powell and Rehnquist dissenting. Id. at 308-31. Justice Stewart's epigram at
the beginning of the article is a response to the following assertion by Chief Justice Burger on behalf
of the dissenters:
[lIt takes little imagination to realize the dramatic and very real differences in terms of
coercive economic power and political interests which distinguish our own States form
foreign sovereigns. The international price fixing, boycotts, and other current
anticompetitive practices undertaken by some Middle Eastern nations are illustrative of
the weapons in the arsenals of foreign nations which no domestic State could ever
employ. Nor do our domestic States, in any meaningful sense, have the conflicting
economic interests or antagonistic ideologies which characterize and enliven the
relations among nations ....
Id. at 327-28 (Berger, C.J., dissenting).
2. A patent right is the right of a person, who has made a patentable invention or discovery,
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uncompromising in supporting patent protection, the second position is
steeped in humanitarian gestures, such as extending U.S. assistance
particularly in efforts to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS outside the United
States. Strong patent protection is, however, the primary U.S. foreign policy
position on how best to facilitate access to essential medicines under patents
held by U.S. and western pharmaceutical corporations. In that sense,
provisions of humanitarian assistance ought to be understood as the policy
prescription most compatible with the non-negotiability of strong
pharmaceutical patent protection.
My basic thesis in this paper is that the humanitarianism underlying
U.S. assistance, particularly in preventing the spread of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic around the world, plays a significant role in simultaneously
disguising and legitimating the uncompromising support of the United States
government for strong international pharmaceutical patent protection.
Indeed, by loudly proclaiming its generosity, the United States manages to
disguise the fact that its commitment to a strong regime of pharmaceutical
patent protection has a lot to do with limiting access to antiretroviral drugs
to large numbers of those infected with HIV/AIDS outside the United States.
In addition to distancing the relationship between strong pharmaceutical
patent protection and access to essential drugs by highlighting the more
appealing image of the United States as a major benefactor of the global
campaign against HIV/AIDS, U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS has turned
to poverty in sub-Saharan Africa as a major explanatory factor to account for
the extremely low level of access to antiretroviral drugs on patents to treat
the disease. Increasing U.S. financial support to combat the spread of the
pandemic, while simultaneously harping on the argument that Africans are
too poor to afford antiretroviral drugs, plays particularly well to ward off
criticism regarding the apparent harshness of U.S. support for strong patent
protection.
Seen in this context, I argue that U.S. policy is moving in the direction
of de-linking or discrediting any association between strong patent
protection and access to antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS infected
populations outside the United States. Placing a high premium on
humanitarianism as the primary policy response to the pandemic in turn
contributes to the invisibility of the link between strong patent protection
and access to essential drugs. It is, therefore, my argument that while the
humanitarianism that typifies U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS and other
life threatening diseases is important, U.S. support for a strong patent regime
imposes huge barriers of access to patented antiretrovirals. Specifically, the
strong protection of patents in the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of
International Property Rights Agreement,3 (TRIPS or the treaty hereinafter),
to exclude others from making, using or selling the patented invention for a limited period of time.
See O-Baily Brown, Compulsory Licensing: Why It's Proposed, Why Dangerous, 195 J. of Com. &
Com. 33 (1943). Strong patent protection means a conception of the patent system which confers an
"unconditional right of exclusion," on the patentee. Id.
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 31 MARRAKESH
[7:2003]
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stands in the way of enabling the treaty to be construed to permit
governments to override it with a view to providing antiretrovirals drugs to
thousands of Africans infected with HIV/AIDS.4
To the extent that patents are therefore a barrier to access
antiretrovirals, the TRIPS Agreement is no more than a form of structural
power.5 The United States, together with its coalition of western intellectual
property exporting countries, exercises structural power because they
prevailed in defining patent protection in the treaty in such a manner as to
make antiretrovirals unaffordable and inaccessible to those that need them
most.6 The countries most afflicted by the HIV/AIDS pandemic do not have
the wherewithal to undertake the research and development necessary to
produce or even manufacture these much-needed drugs. In addition, these
countries do not stand in the same position as the United States to be able to
shape the international patent protection in a manner that enables them to
facilitate affordable access to drugs produced elsewhere. 7 In particular, by
defining patents exclusively in terms of the rights of patent holders while
simultaneously limiting the obligations patent holders may have to
consumers of patented products, as is the case in the U.S. domestic market,
the TRIPS Agreement acts as a significant barrier limiting access to essential
medicines under patent for countries that do not have the wherewithal to set
the international intellectual property agenda like the United States.
Thus, by silencing alternative conceptions of intellectual property rights
that balance the rights of patent holders with the obligations patent holders
may have to consumers of patented products, which would work better to
facilitate access to essential medicines, the law and foreign policy of strong
patent protection reflects the relative ability of the United States to impose
its will on less powerful countries. This often imperceptible asymmetrical
exercise of power through law and policy inscribes outcomes of life and
death for millions infected with HIV/AIDS outside the United States. 8 In my
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNEX IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t.agmO_e.htm.
4. See infra Parts lll.C.4., 11.D.
5. Susan Strange defines structural power as having to do with the ability to set "the rules of
the game." See Conversation With Susan Strange, available at http://www.geocities.com/jt
revino4I/STRANGE.DOC (last visited June 4, 2003). Note, she gives the following example of the
exercise of structural power: "An individual like the Pope has structural power because he manages
the Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church, for example, prevents some Catholics from
contraception or abortion in their range of options; so he is exercising structural power." Id.
6. Susan Strange argues that it is "only by looking at the structural power exercised-often
unconsciously-over other states, markets, private individuals, and firms by the agencies of the
United States can the extent of the asymmetries of state power be appreciated." Susan Strange, The
Defective State, 124 Daedulus 55, 64 (1995).
7. In 1998, 35% of the close to $300 billion pharmaceutical industry in the world was
controlled by the top 10 pharmaceutical companies. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 67 (1999).
8. Joseph Nye argues that this type of "soft power," which involves making other states want
to get what another state wants can be referred to as co-optive power behavior or indirect power.
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view, to sooth these outcomes, U.S. foreign policy has sought to downplay
its crass commitment to strong patent protection while overplaying its
magnanimity in providing humanitarian assistance particularly for efforts to
prevent the spread of the HIV/AIDS crisis. In short, the discourse of charity
and humanitarianism accompanying the uncompromising support of patents
at any cost simply disguises the U.S.'s priorities in ensuring its multinational
pharmaceutical companies acquire markets for their drugs without any threat
to their profitability even in the face of heart-wrenching human need.
This paper also critically examines the efficacy of the claim that
poverty is by far the most critical barrier to affordable antiretrovirals. While
it is undoubtedly true that poverty is an integral barrier to affordable
antiretrovirals, it is not an insuperable barrier. For example, as demonstrated
in Part III, over the last five years or so, prices of antiretrovirals in sub-
Saharan Africa have fallen by large margins, making them affordable to an
increasing number of people. This also means that the funds devoted by
donors and governments for treatment can benefit ever-increasing numbers
of indigent HIV/AIDS patients. Besides, pricing of antiretrovirals
particularly in East Africa is demonstrated to be governed less by the laws of
the market than the laws of the jungle.9 This further undermines the
argument that poverty is an insuperable barrier of access to treatment.
Ultimately, I claim that while poverty is an integral component to lack of
access to affordable antiretrovirals, this in and of itself does not prove that
patents are not integral to lack of access to affordable antiretrovirals. Both
poverty and patents are integral parts of the limitations to access to
affordable antiretrovirals.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I begins by describing the rationale
for strong support for patents in U.S. foreign policy and how this policy
differs with the conception of patent protection within the United States. I
argue that this view of patents has eclipsed into obscurity the view that
patents also ought to be regarded as instruments of public policy giving their
holders rights subject to certain conditions. In Part II, I attempt to discern
where, if at all, access to HIV/AIDS drugs for indigent populations fits
within the United State's national interests. I begin this inquiry by tracing
Africa's place in U.S. foreign policy/national interest and then explore the
engagement of the Clinton and Bush administrations in responding to
increasing concern over the reluctance of the United States to support access
to antiretrovirals in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, in Part III, I contextualize
the emergence of poverty as the major barrier to access of HIV/AIDS drugs
within the U.S.'s policy of strong patent protection. I then proceed to
critically examine the foregrounding of poverty and the distancing of patents
Joseph Nye, Changing Nature of World Power, 105 POL. SC. Q., 181 (1990). As Susan Strange has
argued, "the influence of U.S. laws on patents and property rights in medicine and pharmaceutical
research throughout the world demonstrates a structural power that directly affects the life chances-
good or bad-of millions of people." Strange, supra note 6, at 66.
9. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Prices for Medicine are Exorbitant in Africa, Study Says, N.Y.
TtMES, June 17, 2000, at A6 (quoting the study by Kirsten Myhr, Comparing Prices of Essential
Drugs Between Four Countries in East Africa and with International Prices).
[7:2003]
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in the continuing debate on access to antiretrovirals.
II. PART ONE: THE STRONG PATENT PROTECTION VIEW DOWNPLAYS THE
FACT THAT PATENTS ARE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS SUBJECT TO SIMILAR
CONDITIONS AS ANY TRADE MONOPOLY
Strong patent protection is founded on the view that patents are private
property rights that confer unconditional rights over inventions and
discoveries. Such rights, it is argued, are not a private delegation of public
power.' 0 The basis of this strong patent protection view is that such a level
of unimpeachable protection is a pre-condition or guarantee that patent
holders, such as pharmaceutical companies, reap back their investments in
research and development so that they have the incentive to continue
investing in research and development for new drugs." On this view, any
form of governmental control on the otherwise unconditional rights of
patentees would discourage investment in development of new drugs. Strong
patent protection is achieved not simply by protecting the property interest
in the patent from any form of regulatory control, but also through use of a
monopoly period of twenty years within which a patent holder is protected
from having competitors sell the patented product.' 2
This view of strong patent protection undervalues the fact that the
patent monopoly is granted to an inventor in return for the inventor
producing a benefit to the society. In other words, patents have both a
private as well as a public essence. To refer to patents only as a form of
private property right is therefore to downplay the balance between the
interests of the inventor and the public consuming the patented product
contemplated in many national jurisdictions. 13 For example, the patent and
10. John H. Wigmore, The Patent Monopoly: How It Differs From Trade Monopoly, 195 J.
of Comm. & Comm. 24 (1943) put it best:
[AII the citizen's fundamental personal rights represent simply the State's promise to
exclude other persons from the thing which is the object of the right, i.e., a grant of a
monopoly of use of the thing; that the rights of industrial and intellectual property
(patent rights, and trademarks), are herein no different from the other rights . .. Any
monopoly may be abused... [and that raises a cause for] remedying [the] abuse.
Id. For Wigmore, patents were no different from tangible property rights and as such the injunction
that the abuse of such a tangible right yielded a remedy, applied equally to patents. Id. For supporters
of a strong regime of patents, Wigmore's thesis is problematic.
II. Doha Declaration on the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement & Public
Health, Mar. 14, 2002, Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/340 I 1 6; see also, Alan 0.
Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "'Solution ", 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
47 (2002).
12. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that, "[t]he term of protection available [for
patents] shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date."
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 81.
13. I explore this at length in James Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy Consistently With Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End
Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 747-71 (2001).
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copyright clause of the Constitution' 4 embodies such a balance as interpreted
by the Supreme Court. In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court held that
the "basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress
for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility."' 15
In short, referring to patents primarily as private property rights is to
overshadow their public essence by overstating their privateness. Such an
overstatement of the privateness of patents is exemplified by the enormous
limitations placed on the permissibility of overriding patents through
compulsory and parallel licensing. 16 Such limitations, which privilege the
privateness of patents, is the shield pharmaceutical companies use to
preclude any regulatory controls over patents. By keeping the government
from regulating patents, perhaps in ways that balance the patent holders
rights and those of the users of drugs under patents, patent holders
simultaneously justify reaping the maximum possible profit from their
patents. ' 7
In the domestic context, where the balance tilts too heavily either in
favor of intellectual property rights on the one hand, or in favor of the
intellectual commons on the other hand, some scholars have argued that the
public loses its constitutionally protected right to a vigorous public
domain.' 8 According to this argument, a vigorous intellectual commons is
only possible where the availability of information, knowledge and other
raw data, free from monopoly control, is available to the public and the
private sector to encourage education, research, new discoveries and free
speech. 19 In the context of international intellectual property law, patents are
protected as private property rights with a twenty-year monopoly with
several procedural safeguards protecting the patentee, 20 but that protection is
understood to similarly serve public policy objectives such as the promotion
of technological innovation in developing countries. Patents, in essence, are
understood to serve to the mutual advantages of both producers and users of
14. Article 1, Section 8 provides that Congress shall make laws "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
15. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
16. For example, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement subjects compulsory licensing to
twelve pre-conditions except for public non-commercial use or in situations of national emergencies.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 95-96.
17. As Richard A. Posner argues, "the basic challenge in the fine tuning of intellectual
property rights as striking the right balance between the interest in encouraging the production of
intellectual property and the interest in promoting its widespread use ...." Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 131 Daedalus 5, 11 (2002).
18. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD, 180-217 (2001); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty Notes
Toward a Cultural Geography ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293 (1996).
19. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 180-217.
20. See discussion infra Part 11.
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technological knowledge, to the promotion of social and economic welfare,
and to the balancing of rights and obligations. 2
1
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health recognizes this
dialectical character of patents in the following terms: "[W]e recognize that
intellectual property protection is important for the development of new
medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its effect on prices."
22
Further, the Declaration notes that members recognize that while the TRIPS
Agreement confers flexibilities such as the freedom to establish their own
regimes of international exhaustion and to engage in compulsory licensing,
members are still required to maintain their "commitments in the TRIPS
Agreement., 23 Hence, while the Declaration recognizes the importance of
interpreting and construing the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that would
allow countries to enable access to essential HIV/AIDS drugs through
processes such as compulsory licensing, it nevertheless affirms the
importance of patent protection. 24 This balance between the rights of
patentees and those of consumers of pharmaceutical products is a far cry
from the strong conception of patent protection argued to be embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement by the United States.
Pharmaceutical companies and western governments, such as the
United States, opposed to a dialectical understanding that would allow even
limited exceptions to patent protection for essential drugs, have sought to
disentangle the relationship between patents and high prices for such
essential drugs by overstating the barriers posed by poverty in limiting
access to HIV/AIDS drugs.25 In this context, the world can rest reassured
that the thousands who die of HIV/AIDS every day in sub-Saharan Africa
are dying because they are poor, not because they did not have access to
expensive drugs. 26
Therefore, rather than directly defending the exclusivity of patents from
regulatory controls, the United States now emphasizes that poverty, not the
high price of patented HIV/AIDS drugs, is the explanation for lack of access
to these drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. 7 This position shifts the focus from
pharmaceutical companies and western governments and instead shines the
21. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 86.
22. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement & Public Health, supra note 11, at 3.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. For example, John L. McGoldrick, Executive Vice President of Bristol Myers-Squib
which holds the patent on Zerit, an AIDS drug, commented that the AIDS pandemic "is not about
profits; it's about poverty and a devastating disease .... Karen DeYoung & Bill Brubaker, Another
Firm Cuts HIV Drug Prices, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A01.
26. HIV/AIDS kills eight million people a year mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. See James
Orbinski & Bernard Pecoul, G8: Drugs for Neglected Diseases, available at
http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=05c7c503-7f90-4bdfS8 fead399cfcf44 (June 24,
2003).
27. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement & Public Health, supra note I I at 6.
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light on endemic poverty in developing countries. Implicit in this shift is the
view that poverty, rather than access to essential drugs, accounts for the fact
that less than 2%, or 30,000, of the more than 28.5 million Africans living
with HIV/AIDS virus in 2001 have access to life-prolonging patented
drugs.2
8
Since 1887, when the United States entered into the Union for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Union), in influencing the definition of
patents as a private property right, it has managed to do so by
overshadowing alternative conceptualizations of a patent that acknowledge
simultaneously conceiving patents as instruments of public policy.29
The Union established the first modem international patent convention,
the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
30
Chancellor Bismarck of Germany was greatly opposed to the issuance of
patents for reasons we shall see shortly. 31 The entry of the United States into
the Union in 1887 was therefore regarded as a welcome counterweight to the
German-led anti-patent movement.32 At stake during this first meeting of the
Union members was the vision to be embodied in the Paris Convention:
Would patents be recognized at all, as the German Chancellor did not want
them recognized; or if they were recognized, whether the resulting
Convention would be modeled on the view that patents were a form of
private property as the United States wanted? 3
3
In Germany, Chancellor Bismarck led a group of states of the German
Zollverein Customs Union and economists who were worried that the
expansion of trade and commerce spurred by the industrial revolution would
transform patents into tools of monopolistic and restrictive control from
foreign importers. 31 In Germany, an agreement in 1842 had secured the
exclusive right of patentees to produce "but not the exclusive right to sell. 35
This agreement, in essence, protected German manufacturers at the expense
of foreign manufacturers. There was, however, a group of trade associations,
industrialists and engineers who fought the Bismarck-led anti-patent
28. UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 2002 1 (2002).
29. See James Gathii, The Commoditization of Patents in International Policy: 1887-2003,
LAW & POL'Y (forthcoming 2004).
30. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372; see
also Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Re-Evaluation of the International Patent Convention, 12
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765 (1947).
31. Kronstein & Till, supra note 30, at 767-68.
32. Id. at 766.
33. Id. at 766-70.
34. This Union was formed in 1832 with a view to remove all customs as between its
membership of thirty-nine states, thirty-five monarchies and four free cities. See http://www.ency
clopedia.com/html/G/GermanC lo.asp (June 24, 2003).
35. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 14
(1951).
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movement. 36 This group proposed to strengthen the German patent system
through the establishment of a "uniform patent system for the whole of
Germany."
37
In Germany, as in the rest of Europe where there was a strong anti-
patent movement, those pushing for a strong patent movement eventually
prevailed with the adoption of a unified patent law in 1878. According to
E.T. Penrose, the weakening of the anti-patent movement "was probably
associated with the depression of 1873 and with the increasing nationalism
and protectionism which arose in most countries as the century came to a
close."
38
The anti-patent movement also had its day in Switzerland where
proposals to protect industrial property with patents were defeated in both
1866 and in 1882 through the passage of a patent law which excluded the
textile and the chemical industry from patent protection. 39 This, in effect,
excluded foreign importers from limiting Swiss producers from using their
inventions. However, under pressure from Germany, Switzerland agreed to
protect German patents or face raised duties on Swiss coal-tar and dyestuffs
in Germany.40
Briefly then, prior to the Paris Convention on Industrial Property, there
was a vibrant debate regarding the necessity of a patent regime crossing
national boundaries. Countries such as Germany, which resisted the
recognition of patents as granting exclusive rights to their holders, were in
the throes of balancing between domestic constituencies with conflicting
goals. On the one hand, some constituencies sought to limit the scope of the
patent rights to preclude foreign manufacturers from claiming exclusivity
over methods or processes they had developed when their products entered
Germany. Others wanted reciprocal protection by Germany's trading
partners for the methods or processes they had developed and were available
in other countries. With the adoption of the Paris Convention on the
Industrial Property in 1883, the anti-patent movement seemed to have
withered away, and instead, the stakes of the Convention shifted towards
whether patents would be viewed as tools of public policy or as private
property rights.
In the United States, the natural law tradition, for the most part,
informed the perspective that patents were a form of private property.41
36. Kronstein & Till, supra note 30, at 769-70.
37. PENROSE, supra note 35, at 15.
38. Id.
39. Kronstein & Till, supra note 30, at 778-79.
40. PENROSE, supra note 35, at 16-17.
41. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870). In Seymour, Chief Justice Clifford
observed that "inventions secured by letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as
such are as much entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise during the
term of which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted." Id. This view was affirmed by the
Supreme Court severally in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See also, Cramp & Sons
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Under the natural law tradition, intellectual property rights were justified as
natural rights since they were regarded as the product of one's own ideas
rather than as a private delegation of a public power.4 2 Such a showing in
turn precluded others from enjoying those ideas at the expense of their
owner. In this manner, the ideas came to be recognized as an exclusive
property right. Under such a view, intellectual property rights got their force
less from being a social institution created by the state than from their
recognition as natural rights.43
Such a view of intellectual property rights, therefore, mostly rested on
both a deontological as well as a consequentialist foundation. It is
deontological to the extent that it appeared to rest on a labor theory of value
under which patent rights are justified as a reward for the labor of the
patentee. Alternatively, it is acknowledged as a moral right of the inventor. It
is consequentialist because the patent right is based on the good
consequences of its legal recognition, such as the progress of science and the
useful arts.44 However, consequentialism does not have regard for the moral
rightness of the patent or "the social consequence of the denial to others of
the right to imitate.
' 45
Central to the success of the Paris Convention was the entry of the
United States into the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property in
1887.46 U.S. entry into the Union greatly helped in quashing the Bismarck-
led anti-patent movement and the consolidation of the view of patents as
private property.47 The natural rights idea of patents as a form of private
property prevailed against not just the objections of the anti-patent posture of
Bismarck Germany, but also viz a viz other objectors such as The Economist
magazine of London whose "spirited campaign against the patent system"
was cast in the following terms:
Before ... [the inventors] can ... establish a right of property in
their inventions, they ought to give up all the knowledge and
Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int'l Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918); James v. Campbell,
104 U.S. 356 (1881); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1876); Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v.
Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1876); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
42. Justice Marshall refuting the view that the patent was a monopoly granted by the state for
a temporary period noted: "The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all
which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery, after its enjoyment by the
discoverer for fourteen [now seventeen] years, is preserved . Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218,
242 (1832).
43. PENROSE, supra note 35, at 22.
44. The formulation is used in the patent clause of the U.S. Constitution Article I, section 8:
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8. For a discussion of the deontological and consequentialist views, see Dale A. Nance, Foreward:
Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 757 (1990).
45. PENROSE, supra note 35, at 22.
46. Kronstein & Till, supra note 30 at 769-70.
47. Id.
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assistance they have derived from the knowledge and inventions of
others. That is impossible, and the impossibility shows that that
their minds and their inventions are, in fact, parts of the great
mental whole of society, and that they have no right of property in
their inventions, except that they can keep them to themselves if
they please and own all the material objects in which they may
realize their mental conceptions.
48
These objections to the patent movement were focused on the view that
ideas are incapable of ownership and that the dissemination of one person's
ideas is a reflection of the collective wisdom of the society. 49 The Economist
magazine's objection is teleological to the extent that it argues against the
presumption that inventors should be rewarded for the collective genius of
society. 50 Instead, it would seem that such a teleological approach suggests
that a consequentialist justification of a regime of patents "would only
accidentally produce the objectively correct amount of knowledge and
aesthetic experience" for a society. 51 Under a teleological approach,
therefore, perhaps only the government can objectively determine an
appropriate level of knowledge and aesthetic experience and the mechanisms
necessary to attain it.
Even under a teleological approach, therefore, there is a recurring
question of whether patents over intellectual property are an unjustifiable
state created private monopoly in trade, or an acceptable institution just like
that of the private property over tangible property. This recurring theme
replays itself just as much when the issue is framed in terms of whether
patents are either a form of private property or an instrument of public
policy.52 Ultimately, it would seem then that the question posed by patent
48. Id. at 23, n. 8 (quoting THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 28, 1850, at 1434).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Nance, supra note 44, at 766.
52. There were several other justifications of the international patent regime at the end of the
nineteenth century. The administrative handicaps of patentees from country A getting a patent in
country B have been described in the following terms:
When an inventor applied for a patent in his own country he had to disclose the nature
of his invention, and the publication of the specification attached to this patent
application was held by a few other countries to destroy the newness of the invention
for patent purposes. In applying for a patent in several countries an inventor had to
draw up applications conforming to widely different and extremely detailed rules, he
had strictly to observe complicated procedures, and he had to do all these things within
short periods of time. In the meantime, others might learn of his invention through the
patent application in his own country and patent the invention themselves, if permitted.
Or they ight simply use it, thus either destroying its novelty for patent purposes or
acquiring a legal right to its use which could not be touched even if the original
inventor succeeded eventually in obtaining a patent. Taxes had to be paid on time...
Thus, to obtain and maintain patents in foreign countries, a patentee was usually forced
to incur the expense of obtaining and maintaining patent agents in each country to
defend his interest. Hence a patent who wished to exploit his invention abroad, or to
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policy since the nineteenth century has been whether to think of patents as
either an "institution for the achievement of individual liberty within a social
order" or as private property for the "efficient utilization of resources." 53
With the advent of the TRIPS Agreement, the view of patents as a form
of private property prevailed, as is reflected by the exclusive nature of the
rights conferred to patent holders in that agreement. 4 In addition, these
rights are further buttressed in a number of ways. First, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has, since 1995, protected patents backed up by a
dispute settlement system that is compulsory and binding. This dispute
settlement system is capable of sanctioning States that violate the rights
protected by this patent regime. 5 Second, the TRIPS Agreement departed
from the norm of regulatory diversity underpinning the Paris Convention
model under which patent rights were regarded as a national prerogative
rather than having international scope. 56  Hence, under the TRIPS
Agreement, there is now a minimum international substantive regime of
what intellectual property rights protections countries should adopt. The
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement give countries little choice regarding
the scope and extent of the patent rights they can grant, since the Agreement
aims at deep integration rather than regulatory diversity as in the pre-TRIPS
period.57 For example, the flexibility to exclude certain inventions, such as
pharmaceuticals, from patent protection vanished. The TRIPS Agreement
also puts in place judicial and administrative institutions, procedures,
safeguards and remedies that countries must put in place to further secure the
obtain a revenue from its exploitation abroad by others, or to prevent others from using
his invention to compete with him in foreign markets, had a strong incentive to press
for international agreements which would eliminate the difficulties of obtaining
protection in countries other than his own.
PENROSE, supra note 35, at 42-43 (emphasis added).
53. Nance, supra note 44, at 770.
54. Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement defines as "exclusive" the following rights patents
confer to holders:
I(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having
his consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for
these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to
prevent third parties not having his consent from the act of using the process, and from
the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the
product obtained directly by that process. (2) Patent owners shall also have the right to
assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 94.
55. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was thought of as ineffective and
is now seen or regarded to have become re-energized since the emergence of the WTO in 1995. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 993 (2002).
56. See Samuel K. Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and the Challenge
of a Justice-Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 435 (1998).
57. Gathii, supra note 13, at 761.
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rights protected under the treaty. 58 Only those patents that are capable of
industrial application are protected. 59 Further, the TRIPS Agreement is non-
derogable - countries cannot make reservations without the consent of all
signatory state parties, which seems rather difficult to attain.
60
The high level of patent protection embedded in the TRIPS Agreement
is the result of a long and tortured history. In recent times, this success must
be understood against the backdrop of a shift in U.S. trade policy in the late
1980's.61 This shift demonstrated the new view that the U.S.'s comparative
advantage lay in its unique ability to produce and transform conceptual
notions into intangible flows of idea and money; in short, intellectual
property. 62 Gone were the days when the United States had a superior
advantage in the production of tangible products. The United States was now
in a new era that required a new foreign trade policy.63 This new thinking
was prompted by concerns that countries, especially in Asia, were copying
or mimicking U.S. intellectual property rights.64 These concerns in turn led
to a concerted policy towards enhancing the protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights that ultimately culminated in the TRIPS Agreement.
65
One of the most dramatic examples of this policy shift came with the
amendments to the 1974 Trade Act in 1984 and 1988 adding section 30166
and super section 301 respectively. Super section 301 requires the United
States Trade Representative to unilaterally, without resorting to the WTO,
impose retaliatory trade sanctions on any country in violation of U.S.
58. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 100-03. Articles 42 (fair and equitable procedures),
43 (evidence), 44 (injunctions), 45 (damages), 46 (other remedies), 47 (right of information), 48
(indemnification of the defendant) and 53 (provisional measures) all relate to judicial enforcement
obligations members must have in place as obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Id.
59. Id. at 93.
60. Id. at 110.
61. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 13-57 (1991).
62. Gathii, supra note 13, at 754-59.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000), amended by Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-416, 102 Stat. 1105. Under this section, the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) is required within thirty days after the submission of the annual
National Trade Estimates (foreign trade barriers) to report to Congress those foreign countries that
(1) "deny adequate and effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights" and (2) those
countries under (1) "that are determined by the USTR to be priority foreign countries." Id. The
USTR identifies as priorities only those countries "that have the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies, or practices that ... have the greatest adverse impact on the relevant United States products
and that are not entering into good faith negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral or
multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property rights" protection.
Id. In a challenge at the WTO, this notorious legal provision of U.S. law was sustained. See World
Trade Organization Report of the Panel, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS 152/R 7.22 (Dec. 22, 1999).
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intellectual property rights. 67 These powers have been critical in protecting
U.S. intellectual property rights abroad since they were enacted.
Another example is reflected by a preference of a bilateral approach in
negotiating international patent agreements by the United States in the
1980's. Rather than pursuing the deadlocked Paris Convention path, the
United States began a policy of negotiating bilateral intellectual property
agreements, thereby breaking up the solidarity among developing countries
in the Paris Convention revision meetings, using its new section 301
powers. 68 This policy of bilateral agreements was eventually fortified by the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, which was largely sponsored by a
strong industry/government partnership in the Uruguay Round. When large
developing countries like India and Brazil balked at the enactment of the
TRIPS Agreement, section 301 powers came in handy to whip these
countries into line, for they could not afford to lose access to U.S. markets.
69
As a result, the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement occurred against
the background of a coercive bargaining framework. Such coercion
demonstrates the structural power of the United States. As noted above, by
structural power I mean the ability of the United States, almost unilaterally,
to shape the TRIPS Agreement to the exclusion of equally legitimate
countervailing views. 70 In particular, the United States prevailed in defining
patents almost as non-derogable private property rights without much scope
for derogating from patent protection except for some carefully hedged
situations, such as under emergencies. 71
67. § 2411(a)(I).
68. SUSAN SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTITRUST 132 (1998). Sell notes that by shifting to bilateral intellectual property agreements,
negotiators from developing countries were trade officials who have 'more clout' than intellectual
property officials who were mostly present in the negotiation of the Paris Convention. Id. The U.S.
was then able to leverage itself better since trade officials would be able to influence legislative and
other changes once they reached agreement with the U.S. /i. Sell also notes that prior to the new
policy of bilateral agreements, developing countries tended to vote as a block within a coalition
labeled the Group of 77. Id. at 119-29.
69. Gathii, supra note 13, at 730-31.
70. See also STEPHEN KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST
GLOBAL LIBERALISM 14 (1985) (arguing that regimes are a source of power and intentional efforts
to change them necessarily involve power). Other scholars have argued even in such relations of
unequal power, power is not unilateral but rather relational particularly because the source of the
contested power must be valued by both players for it to be a source of power. See DAVID BALDWIN,
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (1985); DAVID A. BALDWIN, PARADOXES OF POWER (1989).
71. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 95. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the
following rigid requirements for deviating from patent protection:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the govemment or third
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful
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By contrast, in the United States, compulsory licensing is not subject to
exceptions as those that encumber are provided in Article 31 of TRIPS.72
Under U.S. law, the government does not have to seek a license or negotiate
for use of a patent or copyright. Any federal employee can use or authorize
the use of a patent or a copyright under 28 U.S.C section 1498 (a).73 The
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is
or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed
promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which
it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be
for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial
or administrative process to be anti-competitive;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or
goodwill which enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of
the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.
The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated
request, the continued existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct
higher authority in that member;
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct
higher authority in that Member;
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs
(b) and (0 where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct
anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount
of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to
refuse termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to such
authorization are likely to recur;
(1) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent "the
second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent
("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply: (i) the
invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important technical
advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention
claimed in the first patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a
cross-license on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second
patent; (iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-
assignable except with the assignment of the first ....
TRIPS Agreements, supra note 3.
72. Id.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 amended by Pub.L. 94-553, § 105(c), 90 Stat. 2599 (1976); Pub.L. 97-
164, Title 1, § 133(d), 96 Stat. 40 (1982); Pub.L. 100-702, Title X, § 1020(a)(6), 102 Stat. 4671
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right owner is entitled to compensation, but cannot enjoin the government or
a third party authorized by the government to prevent use.74 Use by any
contractor, subcontractor, person, firm, or corporation who receives
authorization from the federal government to use patents or copyrights is
construed as use by the federal government, and cannot be sued for
infringement. 75 Further, compensation is not based on lost profits or
royalties, but rather on reasonable royalty or, as one court has put it, since
compensation is based on eminent domain, the proper measure is "what the
owner has lost, not what the taker has gained."
76
Efforts to achieve this balance, accepted within the U.S. domestic system,
at the international level, is reflected in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health referred to in the introduction. 77 This Declaration requires reading
the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that balances patent protection with access to
pharmaceutical products in the context of WTO members facing public health
emergencies. 78 However, the United States has stood in the way of arriving at a
compromise that would effectuate the intentions of the Declaration. 79 In
addition, the United States has continued to use or threaten the use of its section
301 powers, thereby forestalling any derogation from the strong private property
rights protections for patents embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. 80 As such, the
United States has employed its power in a manner that has not only transformed
the international protection of patents into a regime of strong patent protection,
but has also done so in a manner that actually limits the capability of developing
countries to use medicines now available to treat the millions of their citizens
infected with life-threatening diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
(1988).
74. § 105(c), 90 Stat. 2599; § 133(d), 96 Stat. 40; § 1020(a)(6), 102 Stat. 4671 (1988).
75. § 105(c), 90 Stat. 2599; § 133(d), 96 Stat. 40; § 1020(a)(6), 102 Stat. 4671 (1988).
76. Leesona Corp. v United States, 599 F.2d. 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979). This section, §
1498(a), explicitly provides that it shall not have an extra-territorial effect. Id.
77. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement & Public Health, supra note I1, at 6.
78. Id. at 5. The chapeau of paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration embraces this balancing
approach because the members recognize a number of flexibilities contained therein "while
maintaining [their] commitments in the TRIPS Agreement." Id. In addition, paragraph 5(c) gives
states the right to determine what constitutes a public health emergency or other circumstance of
extreme urgency as part of that flexibility. Id.
79. See infra Part IIL
80. Daya Shanker, Legitimacy and the TRIPS Agreement, 6 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 155,
179-83 (2003).
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III. PART II: THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY:
WHERE DOES ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL DRUGS FOR AFRICANS WITH HIV/AIDS
FIT, IF AT ALL?
A. The National Interest
A central focus of the U.S.'s national interest over the last century has
been economic expansion and world dominance. 81 The United States has
worked to achieve those goals by using its commercial and trading relations
as well as its military power. 82 Therefore, while containing the spread of
communism and the Soviet empire during the Cold War and while
combating terrorism since the attacks of September 11, 2001, expanding
America's economic influence remains a national interest.83 While
economics and national security have been central to U.S. foreign policy, the
national interest has been vaguely defined in the discourse of the U.S.'s
experience and power in the world. 84 The national interest in the post-second
World War period was informed by a realism that simultaneously rejected
economic accounts of the national interest as Marxist determinism and
liberal accounts of the national interest as moralistic, utopian and legalistic.
85
Realist theories "maintain that power is diffused throughout society and
[posit] that the state is a neutral arena or arbiter whose policies are
determined by competition among multiple 'interest groups.. ."'86 For these
realists, the state is independent of the groups lobbying to influence it
"[within] a competitive state system in an anarchic world.",87
According to this post-second World War realism, the national interest
was best protected by an international system whose members were capable
81. See generally JOYCE & GABRIEL KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE WORLD AND
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954 1 (1972); see also JOYCE KOLKO, AMERICA AND THE
CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM 1 (1974).
82. EUGENE P. TRANI, DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, Vol.I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY: STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPAL MOVEMENTS & IDEAS 268-74 (Alexander DeConde ed. 1978);
James Thuo Gathii, Neo-Liberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering the
International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2014-16 (2000).
83. According to Karan K. Bhatia, Deputy Under Secretary for Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "in the post-September I I world, trade security and export controls are
no longer arcane. Rather, they are the stuff of presidential summits and cover stories in major news
magazines." OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, Trade Security Top Concern for
U.S. Government, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/Dec 1202
TradeSecurityBhatia.html.
84. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1999, at 22-
35; Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan., 2000, at 45-62.
85. See generally, HANS J. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1951). According to Morgenthau,
idealism was only relevant to foreign policy to the extent that it could give 'concrete content' and
application in society. Id. at 34.
86. WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S.
INTERVENTION, AND HEGEMONY 26 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
87. Id.
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of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their
power.88 In largely conceiving foreign policy as abstractly agglomerating a
disaggregated set of variables to predict state behavior, realists separated the
political realm from the social-economic order of international relations. 89
This functional autonomy of the political and economic spheres is both false
and misleading. It also disguises the fact that "states [often] serve the
interests of those groups and classes which are dominant in society." 90
Hence, the centrality of economic and military dominance in defining the
national interest is not merely a reflection of a superior policy outcome
among several alternatives. Rather, as some observers have argued, U.S.
foreign policy "reflects the interests of a small elite, which also controls the
domestic political economy, and which is generally not accountable to mass
constituencies and their interests." 91 Hence, it is no surprise that realists and
their progeny are skeptical or reject humanitarian considerations such as
democracy, human rights and charity as central to defining the national
interest in and of themselves, 92 except in so far as they are consistent with
promoting the core aspects of the national interest.93
In addition, realist and neo-realist perspectives of U.S. foreign policy
underestimate the many other ways in which power manifests itself. In other
words, these schools of thought tend to associate power primarily with what
nations do. 9 4 In doing so, realists and neo-realists often underestimate the
diffuse power exercised in international relations through the production and
reproduction of practices, rules, habits and dispositions. For example, the
crafting of the TRIPS Agreement reflects a specific illustration of the social
crafting or construction of a regime governing international relations on
patent protection that privileges one form of protection to the exclusion of
another. As argued in Part One above, as constructed, the TRIPS Agreement
is a form of structural power that portends real consequences for millions of
people around the world.
88. Martti Koskenniemi, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 439 (2001) (citing MORGENTHAU, supra note 85).
89. MORGENTHAU, supra note 85, at 52-56.
90. Id. at 26.
91. Id.
92. Strobe Talbott, Democracy and the National Interest, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1996
at 47-48 (1996). Talbott explains that if the democratic forms of government wildly prevail in the
world community, the U.S. will be safer and more prosperous because "democracies are
demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitment, less likely to engage in
terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other." Id. at 48-49.
For a skeptical view of the place of humanitarian, as opposed to hard-core national interest goals in
U.S. foreign policy, see Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, supra note 84, at 45-62.
93. MICHAEL COX, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR: SUPERPOWER WITHOUT
A MISSION? 117 (Chathain House Papers 1995).
94. See generally Stefano Guzzini, Structural Power: The Limits of Neo-Realist Power
Analysis, 47 Int'l Org. 443 (1993).
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B. Africa: Access to Essential Drugs and the National Interest
In light of the foregoing, one might wonder if access to essential drugs
fits at all within U.S. foreign policy. For if the United States has led the
effort towards defining the international patent regime in a manner that
limits the potential to override patents, one might wonder if there is scope
for a policy of facilitating access to essential drugs within U.S. foreign
policy. There is, of course, no straightforward answer. Part III below will
discuss the U.S. foreign policy view that strong patent protection is
consistent with facilitating access to essential drugs. In this Part, the query
regarding where, if at all, access to essential drugs fits within the U.S. policy
of strong patent protection will begin by examining how sub-Saharan Africa
fits within U.S. foreign policy.
First, let us consider where Africa falls within the U.S.'s foreign policy
priorities. U.S. foreign policy-making on Africa has been characterized as
fragmented among various Executive agencies, all of which in turn interpret
U.S. foreign policy in Africa differently, in accordance with each agency's
own mandate. 95 These agencies include the U.S. Department of State, the
U.S. Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of Commerce. The dominance of these bureaucracies in U.S.
relations with Africa has resulted in an incoherent and inchoate foreign
policy framework. 96 The White House is rarely involved in African foreign
policy making unless national security issues are involved.97 In the post-cold
war period, Congress has sought to further U.S. involvement in Africa by
strengthening trade ties primarily through the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act, which in 1999 became the first trade and investment
legislation focused on Africa considered by the U.S. Congress.98 Another
significant U.S. interest in Africa has been to control and reduce threats to
U.S. security arising from terrorism, the spread of extremist Islamic
movements, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and increasingly,
the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Tuberculosis
95. PETER J. SHRAEDER, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA:
INCREMENTALISM, CRISIS AND CHANGE 11-37 (1994).
96. Id.
97. John F. Clark, The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and the
Foreign Affairs Bureacracies, 26 J. OF OPINION 8 (1998); see also, Peter J. Shraeder, Removing the
Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the Cold War, in EDMOND J. KELLER
& DONALD ROTHCHILD, AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY 195-96 (1996).
98. This legislation was justified as necessary to stimulate new investment from small and
medium sized US. enterprises in Africa. However, its critics point out it is nothing more than a bill
of rights for U.S. corporations without regard to the best interests of Africa and Africans. See,
Claude Kabemba & Chris Landsberg, Opportunity or Opportunism? Behind the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.cps.org.za/execsumm/polbrief2.htm. The
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act was renewed in the Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
116 Stat. 933 (2002).
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and Malaria. 99
Africa becomes, therefore, a foreign policy priority only when it
presents a threat to U.S. security and economic interests. 00 Those
advocating greater U.S. assistance to Africa's HIV/AIDS pandemic have
framed it as an issue implicating the country's national security. For
example, the National AIDS Office of the Bush administration has, for a
long time, framed the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa primarily as an issue
involving strategic security issues of state destabilization and national
economic distress. 10 1 Such a framing ostensibly places the HIV/AIDS
pandemic among the U.S.'s foreign policy priorities, although the post-
September 11, 2001 focus on terrorism certainly eclipses the threat of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. Framing the epidemic in terms of a national security
issue also removes the urgency of dealing with the egregious lack of access
to health care and antiretroviral drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. Treatment
campaigns are overshadowed within U.S. policy on Africa since designating
the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a national security issue relegates the
responsibility to the national security bureaucracies of the Executive branch.
The effect of this relegation is that it excludes the agencies responsible for
foreign assistance development related to programs that have health as part
of their mandate from being at the frontline in combating the pandemic. 102
C. Access to Antiretroviral Drugs versus Prevention in U.S. Policy
To the extent that the Bush administration has been engaged with the
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, the issue of access to antiretroviral drugs has
been eclipsed by a preference for prevention as opposed to treatment
programs. 0 3 The rationale in favor of prevention is that those already
99. Shraeder, supra note 95, at 193-201.
100. Indeed candidate George W. Bush could not have been clearer. In an interview
conducted by Jim Lehrer of PBS during the campaign, he stated that: "While Africa may be
important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them." John Murphy, A
Businesslike View of Africa, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 2001, at 2A; William Douglas, Bush Visit to Africa
in 2003, NEWSDAY, June 21, 2002, at A16. Bush's visit to Africa was subsequently cancelled
indefinitely in light of a probable war with Iraq. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Official to Discuss
Trade; Africa Hopes to Talk AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Jan., I1, 2003, at A4 (noting the cancellation of
Bush's Africa trip); see also, Robert Tait, HIV/AIDS Classified as Threat to U.S. Security, THE
SCOTSMAN, May 1, 2000, at 8 (reporting that the Clinton administration had designated the spread of
AIDS as a 'major threat to US national security'). Bush toured Africa in the summer of 2003. See
Richard W. Stevenson, Back From Africa: Bush's Promises Will be Watched, N. Y. TIMES, July 14,
2003, at A4.
101. Scott Evertz, U.S. Targets Global AIDS Pandemic, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/j
oumals/itgic/1201/ljge/gj01.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
102. Shraeder, supra note 95, at 195.
103. John Donnelly, Policy on Africa Debated Leaders Say Prevention Should Be the Focus,
BOSTON GLOBE, April 7, 2001, at A6; see also, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Report Calls for More Money
for AIDS Prevention, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A22 (reporting that the global HIV Prevention
Working Group found that fewer than one in five people worldwide who are at risk of being infected
by HIV have access to prevention programs).
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infected will die anyway. However, as former President Clinton recently
argued, the fact that millions are already infected by the virus does "not
justify our failure to recognize the moral and practical imperatives to mount
a full-throttle treatment program in conjunction with ongoing education and
prevention programs."' 4 In the United States, where antiretroviral drugs
have been available and accessible for some time now, HIV/AIDS patients
are living longer with more dignity, and there is no reason to expect less in
Africa. 0 5 According to former President Clinton:
Some people argue that treatment is less important than
prevention; a dollar spent on prevention, they say, goes further in
slowing the spread of the disease than a dollar spent on treating
someone who already has it. But this is a false choice. Prevention
doesn't work unless large numbers of people agree to be tested.
They won't agree to be tested if all they will learn is that they are
going to die.
10 6
Another reason to be skeptical of de-linking treatment and prevention is
that by highlighting prevention to the exclusion of treatment, lack of access
to antiretroviral drugs for treatment is banished into the background. This
bias is equally reflected in the work of well-funded private HIV/AIDS
philanthropy groups such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the
Henry J. Kaiser Foundation. 07 Within U.S. HIV/AIDS policy, which is
equally supportive of prevention over treatment, the Bush administration's
prevention programs have greatly reduced support for condom distribution,
which is far more cost-effective than antiretroviral distribution.'
08
Opposition to supporting condom use has been spurred by the Bush
administration with the strong support of the Republican controlled
Congress that disfavors distribution of condoms and similar reproductive
services aimed at arresting the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.1
0 9
Republicans, with support of conservative church groups, oppose financing
public health programs, which depart from a religious opposition to
104. William Jefferson Clinton, AIDS Is Not a Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. I, 2002, at
A9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Access to HIV Prevention: Closing the Gap, A Report by the HIV Prevention Working
Group convened by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/downloads/globalhealth/aids/PWGFun
dingReportSummary.pdf (last visited May 20, 2003).
108. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Secret War on Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A23.
109. When Bush's $15 billion AIDS initiative was approved in the Senate, Congress
required that at least a third of the money be devoted to prevention programs. See House Approves
Global AIDS Bill, CBS News, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/0 I/politics
/main547158.shtml (last visited May 20, 2003). The Bush administration issued a statement that it
would place more emphasis on abstinence relative to treatment. Id.
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measures such as condom distribution, that in their view promote
promiscuity, or abortions which undermine the sanctity of human life.1t 0
Consistent with these beliefs, the Bush administration has also reduced or
stopped support for important family planning programs, including
reproductive services like counseling women on abortions or performing
abortions."' Yet organizations such as the United Nations Family Planning
Agency have been very effective in addressing sexually transmitted diseases,
using a variety of reproductive health services, in developing countries." 2
However, contrary to the policy preferences of the Bush administration,
evidence from Brazil indicates that integrating treatment and prevention
saves on cost in part because the number of individuals with the HIV/AIDS
virus admitted to hospitals has fallen dramatically.' 13
1. African Oil versus the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in U.S. Policy
Besides overshadowing the HIV/AIDS pandemic in general, and Africa
in particular, the war on terrorism has put Africa on the U.S.'s foreign policy
agenda in another respect, one that also backgrounds the HIV/AIDS
pandemic. The uncertainty created by war in Afghanistan and Iraq has had
the United States scrambling to ensure that it has a continuous and
uninterrupted supply of oil.' The United States, under Secretary for
African Affairs Walter Kansteiner, has concluded that "African oil is of
national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more
important as we go forward."' '5 An African Oil Policy Initiative formed
with the specific objective of influencing the White House to turn towards
Africa for U.S. oil needs." 6 The Black Congressional Caucus also has
110. Kati Marton, Protect Women, Stop a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, March I, 2003, at A19.
Democrats by contrast argue that use of condoms "is one of the healthy lifestyles ... along with
monogamy, marriage and faithfulness," that the Bush Administration's AIDS initiatives should
support. See Lawmakers Agree on AIDS Bill Details, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at A 19.
I1l. Erica Goode, Certain Words Can Trip Up AIDS Grants, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES,
April 18, 2003, at AI0; See Miriam Kagan, Bush 'Gag Order' Chokes Global Familv Planning-
NGOs, CyberDyaryo, Sept. 26, 2003, available at http://cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2003_092
6_04.htm.
112. Ellen Goodman, Cutting Off Women to Spite China. BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 2002, at
All . Secretary of State Colin Powell has been reluctant to buy into this pro-prevention without
treatment approach. See Marsha Mercer, Global hnpact of AIDS Commands Attention, TAMPA
TRIB., May I, 2002, at 11; Coates, et al., HIV/AIDS is an 'Unprecedented Danger' Neglected in
Bush's State of the Union Address (Feb. 1, 2002), at http://www.afronets.org/archive/
200202/msgO000.php; Ceci Connolly, Bush Aides Defend AIDS Policies from Council Criticism,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at A13.
113. Clinton, supra note 104.
114. Carl Mortished, U.S. Presses Africa to Turn on the Tap of Crude Oil, LONDON TIMES,
July 29, 2002, at 36.
115. Id.
116. Mike Crawley, With Mideast Uncertainty. US Turns to Africa for Oil, CHRISTIAN SCt.
MONITOR, May 23, 2002, at 07.
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sought to persuade the Bush administration to import more oil from
Africa. 117 Although some analysts suggest that oil may improve Africa's
fortunes in U.S. foreign policy after all," 18 it is not clear that it will
necessarily lead to strengthening U.S. funding towards treatment. In fact, the
turn to African oil simply reaffirms the centrality of trade and commercial
interests within U.S. foreign trade policy. If oil is becoming increasingly
central to U.S./African relations, it seems that there is far less of a chance
that the United States will advocate challenging patents to facilitate access to
antiretrovirals to Africa.
2. Pharmaceutical Company Profits versus AIDS Patients in U.S. Policy
The conclusion that the United States would disfavor overriding patents
to facilitate access to essential drugs is best demonstrated by American
response to South Africa with regard to protection of patent rights. In 1997,
South Africa passed an amendment to its Medicines and Related Substances
Act, authorizing the use of compulsory licensing and parallel importing to
provide low cost medications to South Africans in need. 19 Over 30% of the
South African population is infected with HIV. 2° With the high mortality
and morbidity rate, the enactment of this law signaled some willingness on
the part of the government to begin laying a framework for facilitating
access to antiretrovirals. 12 1 This Act was never implemented, in large part
because of aggressive actions by the United States government and the
multinational pharmaceutical industry.' 22 The United States added South
Africa to the infamous section 301 watch list, under which countries that the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) reports to have violated patents
granted in the United States are subject to trade sanctions prior to a
determination of violation under the TRIPS Agreement. 123 In essence, as
noted earlier, section 301 authorizes the use of unilateral trade sanctions as a
117. Jo Ann Zuniga, Black Caucus Members Get Energy Tours, HOUS. CHRON., July 2,
2001, at A2 I.
118. James Dao, In Quietly Courting Africa, White House Likes Dowry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2002, at AI.
119. Medicines & Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 amended by Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.); see also Zackie Achmat, We Can
Use Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports: A South African Case Study, at
http://wwwsewer.law.wits.ac.2a/cals/OLPalp/tac/license.shtml. (last visited June 10, 2003); Anthony
Stoppard, Health-South Africa: Drug Companies Drop Lawsuit Against Government, INTER PRESS
SERV., available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010413.html (Apr. 19, 2001).
120. Jenni Fredriksson & Steve Berry, South Africa HIV/AIDS Statistics, available at
http://www.avert.org/safricastats.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2003).
121. Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping Over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the
Manmfacturing of Scarcity, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 157, 157 (2002).
122. Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South
Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 136-39 (2002).
123. See infra Part 1.
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retaliatory measure by the United States.' 24 To further illustrate the U.S.'s
support for a policy of strong patent protection is the fact that an additional
factor informing the USTR's citation of South Africa under section 301 was
South Africa's support of a proposal at the World Health Organization to
add HIV/AIDS drugs to the WHO's essential medicines list. 125 The USTR
report on South Africa also bore a striking resemblance to the February 16,
1999, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA)
submission to the USTR, urging the USTR to take action against South
Africa for taking action inconsistent with the protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights. 1
26
Following these actions, the U.S.-South Africa bi-national panel, which
both then Vice President Al Gore and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki co-
chaired, became the forum that produced a framework for resolving South
Africa's listing by the USTR under section 301.127 As a result, and in light of
his connections to the pharmaceutical industry, especially in terms of the
funding of his 2000 presidential bid, Gore became a target for AIDS activists
seeking to reform U.S. policy towards developing nations facing the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 128 Leading this group of activists was HealthGAP, a
coalition group comprised of various activist groups. 129 HealthGAP took
advantage of the added publicity Gore was receiving as a result of his run for
the Presidency in an attempt to bring the issue of access to HIV/AIDS drugs
in South Africa to the forefront of the media. 30 The activists went to
Tennessee and disrupted Gore's campaign, chanting and carrying banners
that read: "GORE'S GREED KILLS".' 3 ' This protest spurred a series of
similar demonstrations throughout Gore's campaign, which had the desired
result of bringing the issue of access to affordable essential antiretroviral
drugs to the attention of not only the media, but to the U.S. administration as
well. 132
124. Id.
125. For the USTR's report listing South Africa under § 301 dated April 30, 1999, see
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/04/99-4l .html (last visited June 10, 2003).
126. See http://www.phrma.org/isues/nte/safrica.html; James Love, Annotated USTR 301
Report Against South Africa, available at http://lists.essential.org/pharm-policy/msg00078.htm (last
visited June 10, 2003.
127. Bob Davis, Gore Hopes New AIDS Pact Will Help Shake Protesters, WALL ST. J.,
August 12, 1999, at A24.
128. For a closer look at South Africa's own attempts to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic
using a rights framework, see James Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS
Pandemic, 14 FL. J. INT'L L. 278-95 (2002).
129. For more information on HealthGAP, see http://www.healthgap.org. (last visited June
10, 2003).
130. Davis, supra note 127, at A24.
131. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 481,
503 (2002).
132. Id.
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As a result of the media attention, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky announced on September 17, 1999, that an agreement was
reached with South Africa that would lead to their removal from the section
301 watch list. 133 On December 1 of that same year, President Clinton
announced that the United States would change its trade policies to support
greater access to medications for developing nations facing an AIDS
crisis.1 34 In an Executive Order signed on May 10, 2000, President Clinton
stated that the United States would not seek the revocation or revision of any
intellectual property law in sub-Saharan African nations, so long as they
promote access to HIV/AIDS medication or treatments.' 35 This Executive
Order, however, required sub-Saharan African countries to provide adequate
and effective intellectual property protection as a precondition for increasing
access to HIV/AIDS drugs.' 36 This condition reflects how U.S. foreign
policy of increasing access to antiretroviral drugs gives shelter to the priority
of strong patent protection. On the one hand, there is a willingness to
succumb to pressure and to acknowledge that patents do not trump public
health. Conversely, there is continuity in insisting that any access to
essential medicines should not compromise providing adequate and effective
intellectual property protection.' 
37
Vice-President Gore managed to marshal support within the
administration for more money for HIV/AIDS initiatives for Africa and
highlighted the importance of the issue by participating in Security
Council's focus on public health and Africa in the month of January 2000.
However, these initiatives did little to grapple with the issues of whether
patents were in any way related to the access and affordability of HIV/AIDS
drugs.' 
38
133. See Press Release, Department of Trade and Industry, Joint Understanding Between the
Governments of South Africa and the United States of America (Sept. 17, 1999), at
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1999/prO9l7b.htm (last visited June 11, 2003); see also
Simon Barber, US Remains Hostile to South Africa Drugs Act, Bus. DAY, Sept. 27, 1999, at 4; Black
Radical Congress, Activists Lock Gore Out of His Office, Criticizing SA AIDS, Drugs Deal, AFR.
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 25, 1999, at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a37c4c4fe58fa.htm.
134. Barber, supra note 133, at 4. This did not, however, soften support within PhrMA and
Congress for taking a tough line on South Africa. Id.
135. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, 30,522 (May 10, 2000).
136. Id.
137. Gathii, supra note 13, at 752-63.
138. Correspondents in New York and Geneva, US Vows $228 million for AIDS War, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 12, 2000, at 8; James Gerstenzang & Maggie Farley, Vows to Intensify AIDS
Battle Disease: U.N. Security Council for First Time Addresses World Health Issue. U.S. Hopes to
Double Funding to $325 Million to Counter 'Security Threat, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at 9; Sam
Allis, Holbrooke Puts UN Focus on Africa's Wars, Aids Epidemic, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2000, at
Al.
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3. Lobbying the U.S. for Greater Empathy Before President Bush's 2003
State of the Union Address
The tactics and efforts of activists to bring attention to U.S. policy of
strong patent protection and the HIV/AIDS crisis did not diminish with
Gore's presidential hopes. The current Bush administration has faced many
of the same criticisms, as was demonstrated in 2002 at the XIV International
Aids Conference in Barcelona.' 39 Although the Bush administration
continued the Executive Orders signed by President Clinton, the Bush White
House has not been spared its share of criticism for doing less than is called
for to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic.' 40 At the 2002 Aids
Conference in Barcelona, U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary
Tommy Thompson was shouted down by pro-treatment/anti-U.S. activists
who stormed the stage when he rose to address the conference.' 41 The
United States was also accused of misrepresenting and being "miserly" with
their contributions to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria. 142 The amount the fund has raised so far is around $2.8 billion, well
short of the stated $10 billion needed to bring AIDS under control. 43 The
criticisms aimed at the United States are a result of the fact that it contributes
less per capita than other leading industrialized countries, and it counts some
bilateral assistance as contributions to the fund, thereby overstating U.S.
support towards addressing the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. 144
In essence, U.S. policy regarding the balancing of consumer rights
with producers' intellectual property rights, both domestically and globally,
has been influenced by the policy of strong intellectual property rights
protection. The concessions that the United States has been willing to make
have come under enormous public pressure by groups like HealthGAP and
ACTUP, thereby confirming that breaking patents to facilitate access to
HIV/AIDS patients is not a U.S. foreign or domestic policy priority. At the
domestic level, this policy of strong patents protection at any cost is
evidenced in a variety of judicial decisions that have expanded the scope of
patent protection beyond explicit Congressional mandate to encompass
139. Geoff Dyer, Activists Attack US Stance on Fighting AIDS, FIN. TIMES, available at
www.FT.com (July 9, 2002).
140. In February 2001, Joseph Papovich, the U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual
Property Rights, stated that President Bush was "not considering a change in the present 'flexible
policy' on compulsory licensing of drugs by AIDS-stricken countries." GRAEME DINWOODIE ET AL.,
INT'L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y 436 (2001).
141. Sanjay Gupta, Bush's Thompson Booed at AIDS Conference, at http://ww
w.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/09/thompson.aids.conference (July 9, 2002).
142. David Brown, Disease Fund Says Money Needs Grow, Global Effort Against AlIDS, TB,
Malaria May Need $20 Billion in 2007, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2002, at A2.
143. CBS News, U.S. Under Fire At AIDS Conference, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stori
es/2002/07/08/health/maint514417.shtml (July 9, 2002).
144. Id.
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genetically created life forms 45 and business methods. 146 There has been a
surge in the recent past of legislative proposals to reclaim the balance
between the rights of patent holders and users of patented products. 47 Some
have focused on making prescription drugs affordable but such proposals
have faced the uphill task of the pharmaceutical lobby and support in
Congress. For example, a recent bill entitled the Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2002 sought to recognize the benefits
that generic drugs offer to consumers by providing for accelerated approval
of generic drug applications, as well as allowing a drug to be considered a
bio-equivalent of a listed drug so long as tests show that the effects have no
significant difference. 148 Although passed by the then democratic-controlled
Senate, the bill did not make it in the Republican controlled House.
However, in July 2003, the House passed its own version of the bill, sending
it back to the Senate. 49 Earlier, on October 21, 2002, not long before the
2002 mid-term elections, the White House reversed course on its opposition
to the initiative of speeding up generic drug entry into the market. 5 ° On that
day, President Bush announced a proposed rule that would prohibit brand-
name pharmaceutical companies from getting multiple 30 month stays
before their drugs run out of patent protection, thereby delaying entry of
cheaper generic drugs on the market. 15 1 Though the President did eventually
intervene to accelerate entry of drugs into the generic market, Congress in
effect shied away from this arrangement, thereby opening this area to further
complex litigation that may reverse this gain for prescription drug
consumers. 1
52
145. For example, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
intellectual property rights in the absence of express congressional authorization by holding that
non-naturally occurring manufacture (or genetically created micro-organisms or life forms) qualify
as patentable subject matter. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
146. For example, in State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin Group, the scope of
patentable subject matter was extended to include a business method. State Street Bank and Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The federal circuit Court of Appeals
observed, "the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers,
outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject
matter, unless.., its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible result."' id. at 1374
(citing In re Alappat. 33 F.3d 1526, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). According to Richard Posner, such
lowering of the threshold of patentability has resulted in too many resources "being sucked into the
creation of new biotechnology, computer software, films, pharmaceuticals, and business methods
Posner, supra note 17, at 12.
147. See, e.g., S. 812/H.R. 5311, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5272, 107th Cong. (2002).
148. S.812.
149. ASSOCIATED PRESS, House Backs Drug Imports to Cut Costs, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 26, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/l04127.html.
150. President Takes Action to Lower Prescription Drug Prices, Oct. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200 21021 -2.html.
151. Vonronica Kolidakis, President Bush Announces FDA Proposal To Speed Access to
Generic Medicines, U.S. L. WEEK, Oct. 29, 2002, at 2282-83.
152. Id.
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The dangers of collusion between brand name drug companies and
generic companies restraining entry of drugs into the generic market still
remain. 153 Even in the domestic context, prescription or brand name drug
consumers often pay a premium on drugs directly related not only to the
U.S. government's policy of strong patent protection, but also to the conduct
of the pharmaceutical industry as well. 1
54
It has therefore been easier to pass legislation to fund various
HIV/AIDS initiatives that do not directly involve compromising patents. For
example, in December of 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
the Global Access HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness, Education, and
Treatment Act of 2001,155 which authorized the appropriation of $750
million toward the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000156 and
$50 million for the procurement and distribution of HIV/AIDS
pharmaceuticals for developing countries. 157 These humanitarian and
charitable initiatives have benefited from some legislators, celebrities and
top government officials visits to Africa. These individuals witnessed the
AIDS scourge first hand, and have often shifted positions by becoming
champions of the anti-AIDS crusade. 58 The most significant shift was that
of former Senator Jessie Helms, whose conversion in favor of further U.S.
funding for HIV/AIDS initiatives in Africa came after decades of his
opposition to foreign aid to the continent when he chaired the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. 59 Senator Helms' change of heart was central
to the Bush administration's decision to focus on mother-to-child
153. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 166 F. Supp. 2d 740
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). The court issued the ruling barely a month before the anthrax scare following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and dismissed Bayer's attempt to forestall a suit against it by
Ciprofloxacin consumers alleging antitrust violations. ld. The court allowed the case to go to trial
after several attempts on Bayer's part to derail such a possibility through litigation. Id. Courts have
not yet recognized sham litigation as one of the ways in which patent holders seek to immunize
themselves from antitrust and patent challenges. James Thuo Gathii, Consumer and Pharmaceutical
Dimensions of Addressing Bio-Terrorism: An Analysis of In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation, 4 Gov'T, L. & POL'Y J. 46 (2002). Other important prescription drugs in respect
of which there have been antitrust challenges include AstraZeneca, Buspirone and Cardizem CD. Id.
For a further discussion, see id.
154. There has been a similar unwillingness to support legislation, such as the Debt
Cancellation for HIV/AIDS Response Act of 2001, that linked the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa to
the debt crisis in Africa. See Press Release, Barbara Lee, Congresswoman, Ninth Congressional
District of Columbia (Apr. 29, 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/lee/releases/OlApr25.htm;,
GLOBAL AIDS ALLIANCE, G7 Leaders are Turning Their Backs on Africa, June 25, 2002, available
at http://www.globalaidsalliance.org/press250602.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2003); see also James
Wolfensohn, A War Chest to Fight AIDS, WASH. POST, April 28, 2001, at A21.
155. Kevin Ivers, GOP House Passes Comprehensive Global AIDS Legislation, GA. LOG
CABIN, Dec. 11, 2001, available at http://www.lcrga.com/archive/200112111731 .shtml.
156. Id.
157. See Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness, Education, and Treatment Act
of 2001, H.R. 2069, 107th Cong., §§ 4(a)-(c), 7 (2001).
158. Jesse Helms, We Cannot Turn Away, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2002, at B7.
159. Id.
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transmission of the virus. 160 A similar shift towards advocating more
governmental support for similar initiatives on the part of President Thabo
Mbeki of South Africa has given further traction and impetus to this
initiative. 161 A visit to the continent by former Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill and Bono, lead singer of the rock band U2, in May 2002162 further
highlighted the fact that support for more U.S. assistance addressing the
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa would depend, in part, on leaders taking a
personal interest in the matter, just as the activists had stirred the
administration to begin to more actively get involved: 163 Unfortunately,
President Bush not only rejected a Congressional appropriation bill
containing a provision backed by Senator Jessie Helms which provided $500
million U.S. assistance to support HIV/AIDS programs around the world,
but Senate Republicans also 'killed' "a bill agreed on unanimously in the
House and Senate, that would have provided $4 billion over two years to
fight global AIDS."'
164
4. U.S. Support for Strong Patent Protection over Access to Essential Drugs
at the WTO
These gestures of diplomatic empathy at the domestic level come
alongside U.S. intransigence that patents should not be broken both at home
and at the WTO. This intransigence was most recently epitomized in the
debate at the TRIPS Council in preparation for the Doha Ministerial
Conference at the end of 2001.165 The United States ultimately acceded to
signing the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, as a political, not
a legally binding instrument 166 which recognizes the importance of
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that balances the rights and
obligations of producers and consumers of intellectual property rights.
160. Editorial, Will Helms' Conversion Brings $500 Million for AIDS, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29,
2002, at A38.
161. Confronting AIDS, COURIER-JOURNAL, May 21, 2002, at 8A.
162. ASSOCIATED PRESS, AIDS Crisis Angers O'Neill, Bono, CII. TRIB., May 25, 2002, at 4;
Reuters, 'Odd Couple'Decries Soweto AIDS Revelations, TORONTO STAR, May 25, 2002, at A33.
163. Activists criticized the Bush administration Mother-to-Child initiative because the
assistance would be channeled bilaterally as opposed to through the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB
and Malaria. See Jim Lobe, Activists Slam Bush AIDS Initiative, June 19, 2002, available at
http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2002/ip02061 .htm. According to the activists, the administration
was worried that the Fund would use the money to buy the patented drugs from generic companies
in the third world rather than from the patent holding companies in the west. Id.
164. Editorial, More Than Words to Fight AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 26; see also
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, Bush Decision to Reject Emergency Funds for Global
AIDS Fight is Shameful Medical Group Says, available at http://www.phrusa.org/cam
paigns/aids/release081302.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2002).
165. James Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002).
166. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 7 J. Gender Race & Just. 295 2003
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
However, the United States made the following arguments mostly consistent
with its view of strong patent protection.167 First, strong intellectual property
protection would be the best guarantee for affordable HIV/AIDS drugs to
enter the market.' 68 Second, the United States argued that a separate TRIPS
and Public Health declaration was unwarranted because developing and least
developed countries had not proved that the TRIPS Agreement limited
access to essential medicines.' 69 Third, the United States argued that the
TRIPS Agreement already granted flexibility to developing and least-
developed countries in terms of longer transition periods in the treaty for
their compliance.' 70 Although the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health was eventually passed unanimously, it reflects U.S. foreign policy to
the extent that it both reiterates a commitment to the TRIPS Agreement's
strong protections of patent rights and acknowledges that these protections
"should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all."'
7
'1
D. Cipro and the Anthrax Scare: Testing U.S. Support for Strong Patent
Protection at Home
The following discussion of the U.S. government's response to the
anthrax scare and the attendant fears of a bio-terrorist attack created after the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, further
demonstrates the reluctance of the U.S. administration to break patents, even
when the United States faces a potential public health crisis. As soon as the
presence of anthrax spores was discovered in the offices of leading news
organizations and in the offices of congressional leaders, there were
immediate calls for the amassing of Ciprofloxacin, since it is the widely
preferred antibiotic for patients infected with anthrax.
72
One alternative the government had under federal law, besides
subsidizing Bayer to stockpile the drug, was using its eminent domain
powers to override the patent by issuing compulsory licenses to generic
companies to manufacture the drug. 173 The government considered, but did
167. Id.
168. Cecilia Oh, U.S. Opposed to Moves to Address Public-Health Concerns About TRIPS,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK ONLINE, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl31f.htm (last visited June
10, 2003).
169. Gathii, supra note 165, at 297.
170. Id. at 296-97.
171. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/englisli/thewto-e/minist-e/mi n01_c/mindedltri
ps-e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
172. See Gathii, supra note 153, at 46-49.
173. Section 1498(a) of 28 U.S.C. provides that the US government does not have to seek a
license or negotiate for use of a patent or copyright. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 amnended by Pub.L. 94-553, §
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not invoke this power. Instead, it entered into an agreement with Bayer,
under which it agreed to subsidize Bayer's production of 1.2 billion
Ciproflaxacin (Cipro) pills for stockpiling.' 74  This stockpile would,
according to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, be
adequate to protect at least 10 million Americans on a two-pill regimen for
sixty days in the event of a bio-terrorist attack. 7 5 Under this agreement
between the government and Bayer, Bayer initially agreed to lower the retail
price of Cipro from $4.50 a pill to $1.89 a pill. 76 Eventually, Bayer agreed
to further lower the price of a pill to 95 cents.1 77 For its initial order of 100
million pills, the U.S. government therefore agreed to pay Bayer $95
million.
78
Notwithstanding Bayer's concession to lowering the price of the drug,
observers have noted that the government shortchanged American tax-
payers, since "Indian companies sell a generic version of the same drug for
less than 20 cents."' 79 In other words, American consumers would have been
better off if the government invoked its eminent domain powers and issued
compulsory licenses to generic manufacturers who would produce
Ciproflaxacin at a lower cost and in greater quantities as a safeguard against
a bio-terrorist threat.180 Hence, critics of the federal government have argued
that it sacrificed public health at the alter of intellectual property rights, by
allowing Bayer to continue to be the sole supplier of Ciproflaxacin.18
1
105(c), 90 Stat. 2599 (1976); Pub.L. 97-164, Title 1, § 133(d), 96 Stat. 40 (1982); Pub.L. 100-702,
Title X, § 1020(a)(6), 102 Stat. 4671 (1988). Any federal employee can use or authorize the use of a
patent or a copyright. Id. The right owner is entitled to compensation, but cannot enjoin the
government or a third party authorized by the government to prevent the use. id. Any contractor,
subcontractor, person, firm, or corporation who receives authorization from the federal government
to use patents or copyrights cannot be sued for infringement. Id. Compensation is not based on lost
profits or royalties, but rather on reasonable royalty or, as one court has put it, since compensation is
based on eminent domain, the proper measure is 'what the owner has lost, not what the taker has
gained.' Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d. at 969. This section explicitly provides that it shall not have extra-
territorial effect. Id.
174. See Timothy J. Burger, Feds Push Bayer to Boost Cipro Stockpile, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 20, 2001, at 8 (reporting that Secretary Tommy Thompson had rejected an assertion by Senator
Chuck Schumer "that the government would save money by using its legal power to authorize other
manufacturers to use Bayer's patent on Cipro.").
175. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HHS, BAYER AGREE TO CIPRO
PURCHASE, Oct. 24,2001, available at http://www.hh.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011024.html.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, The Cipro Rip-Off and the Public Health, at
http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2001-12/02mokhiber-weissman.cfm (Dec. 2, 2001).
180. See Letter from Ralph Nader and James Love to Tommy Thompson Regarding
Ciprofloxacin, DHHS Secretary, (Oct. 18, 2001) (on file with author).
181. See also David Olive, It's Sad Sight to See Ottawa Ready to Give in to Bayer on Drug,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 23, 2001, at E03 (providing a similar story in Canada). For a more recent
editorial, see Ramon Castellblanch, Selling Out Seniors To Protect Drug Industry Profits, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 14, 2002, available at http://www.biohope.org/
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There is yet another consideration that factored into the U.S.'s refusal to
issue compulsory licenses over Cipro. The United States does not want to
undermine the legitimacy of its negotiating position with developing
countries over whether the World Trade Organization treaty, TRIPS, allows
these countries to override patents which would enable them to effectively
address the HIV/AIDS pandemic.18 2 The United States has consistently
opposed the efforts of developing countries to override patent protection that
would legally allow them to produce generic equivalents of the patented
drugs used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS patients. 183 Towards the end of
2002, the U.S.'s objections at the TRIPS Council foreclosed an agreement
regarding whether to permit countries with no manufacturing capacity, who
are suffering health emergencies such as HIV/AIDS, from engaging
countries with a manufacturing base in order to produce essential medicines
on their behalf.184 This scuttled negotiations on paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. Paragraph 6 had left for further
deliberation the question of whether countries without manufacturing
capacity, but experiencing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, can to take advantage
of the flexibility of overriding patents ostensibly agreed on in the
Declaration. 85 The United States was frustrating agreements on this issue at
a time when the Central Intelligence Agency was warning that the AIDS
pandemic continues to spread in Africa and beyond in ways that heighten
U.S. security risks. 186 In sum, safeguarding patents has been a top priority
media/articleprint.cfm?articleid=3109.
182. Gathii, supra note 165, at 315.
183. Cecilia Oh, Developing countries call for action on TRIPS at Doha WTO Ministerial
Conference, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl31d.htm (last visited June 10, 2003).
184. HEALTH GAP, Thanks to U.S. bullying, no deal this year on access to medicines at the
WTO. Poor countries prevent U.S. re-write of the Doha agreement on public health, available at
http://www.globaltreatmentaccess.org/content/press-releases/02/ 122002-HGAP-WTO-US-exp
.html (Dec. 20, 2002).
185. Faizel Ismail, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and the Negotiations
in the WTO on Paragraph 6 - Why PhRMA Needs to Join the Consensus!, 6 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP., 393, 395 (2003). However, note that reports just prior to the final edit of this article indicate
that the U.S. has backed off its opposition to a compromise solution at the WTO that would ensure
access to essential drugs for millions infected with the HIV/AIDS virus. See Elizabeth Becker, In
Reversal, U.S. Nears Deal on Drugs for Poor Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at Al. Note
however that the Cancun Ministerial talks about how the agreement on Paragraph 6 would have been
ratified broke down. Id.
186. More Than Words to Fight AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, December 16, 2002; INT'L CENTRE FOR
TRADE AND SUBSTAINABLE DEV., WTO Fails To Meet TRIPs [sic] & Health Deadline Due To US
Opposition, BRIDGES UPDATE (Jan. 2, 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/
ministerial/cancun/TRIPS-updatehtm This article reports that:
Negotiations on TRIPs [sic] and health broke down in the early hours of 21 December
over the US' refusal to accept the Chairman's proposed disease coverage for the para. 6
solution, i.e. "public health problems afflicting many developing and least- developed
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics" as set out in para. I of the Doha Declaration .... In a last-minute attempt to
reach a deal, the US suggested the inclusion of a footnote that would expand its
previously proposed list of diseases from three (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) to
[7:2003]
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for the United States and, as such, efforts to address the HIV/AIDS crisis
have had to contend with the inflexibility of this attachment to the
exclusivity of pharmaceutical patents.
1. 2003: U.S. $15 Billion for Fighting HIV/AIDS
In his 2003 State of the Union address to Congress, President Bush
announced an unprecedented initiative on the part of the United States to
support the global effort to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic.' 87 This $15
billion initiative would provide AIDS drugs for two million people infected
with the virus, care for 10 million AIDS patients and orphans, and provide
education to prevent the epidemic from spreading further. 188 This widely
applauded plan 189 was eventually approved by the Senate on May 16, 2003
when it voted to appropriate just over $3 billion in the first installment of
this five year initiative. 190 However, President Bush's 2004 budget only
proposes to spend less than half of that amount in twelve African countries
and two in the Caribbean.' 9' The Bill, as passed, also requires that a third of
the money go to programs to promote abstinence until marriage.' 
92
The reasons for increased U.S. support in combating the HIV/AIDS
pandemic is the result of a variety of events including activist pressure and
the shifting attitudes of U.S. government leaders about the overwhelming
need to support efforts to curb the crisis.' 9 3 The plan has, however, been
criticized for compromising rather than working with the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria since the money would be spread wider and
faster and for introducing religious priorities that limit addressing
23 and "other epidemics of comparable gravity and scale", [sic] including those that
might arise in the future. Developing countries, however, rejected this proposal, arguing
that it would restrict the mandate given by the Doha Declaration, which refers more
generally to "measures to protect public health" (para. 4). They also rejected a proposal
by the EU that the US could make a statement to the effect of its proposed footnote,
which would then be supported by the TRIPs [sic] Council Chair as the framework for
implementing the solution.
Id.
187. Rachel L. Swains, African Nations Applaud Bush Plan to Fight AIDS Epidemic, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A19.
188. Id.
189. Id.; Rachel L. Swarns, Free AIDS Drugs in Africa Offer Dose of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2003, at Al; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Richard W. Stevenson, The President's Proposals: AIDS
Policy; Bush AIDS Effort Surprises Many, But Advisors Call It Long Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2003, at Al.
190. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves AIDS Bill, Pleasing White House, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2003, at A13.
191. Id.
192. Id; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The World: A Calling to Heal, Getting Religion on
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at Al.
193. Mike Allen & Paul Blustein, Unlikely Allies Influenced Bush to Shift Course on AIDS
Relief WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2003, at AO1.
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transmission of HIV/AIDS through condom use among other criticisms. 194
Most important, the critics have observed that to the extent that the new
initiative will buy drugs from brand name companies rather than encourage
cheaper generics, the expense will limit the number of people that it can
benefit.'9 5
President Bush cloaked the new initiative in the mantra of compassion
and morality. 196 Indeed, as President Bush said in an address on Global
HIV/AIDS the day after his state of the Union address:
This is a historic year for America ... We have a chance to
achieve peace. We have a chance to achieve a more compassionate
world for every citizen. America believes deeply that everybody
has worth, everybody matters, and everybody was created by the
almighty. And we're going to act on that belief, and we'll act on
that passion.
197
The fact that the United States was, at the time, strongly supporting
military action in Iraq notwithstanding opposition to war policy across the
world might have factored into the making of this gesture. Although Bush
administration officials are said to have denied that "politics" had anything
to do with the announcement, they acknowledged that it might have
"beneficial ripple effects, especially in helping burnish the country's image
abroad."' 98 Further, these Bush administration officials are said to have
hoped that the announcement of the initiative at a time when the
administration was moving rightward in its "economic policy, judicial
nominations and other issues," would "remind moderate voters of Bush's
claim to be a compassionate conservative."' 99
Ultimately, whatever motivation the Bush administration had in
supporting this new initiative, the support indicates that there is more
concern and commitment than ever before in doing something about the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. That said, there continues to be a strong continuity in
U.S. support for strong pharmaceutical patents even with increased U.S.
assistance to combat the pandemic. As we have noted earlier, foreign
194. See Sabin Russell, Fears, Cheers Over Bush AIDS Pledge: Plan Shortchanges Global
Fund. Activists Say, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2003, at A5; AIDS Plan Offer Hope: But Some Activists
Worr
, 
Global Funds Mal' Not Reach Victims, NEWSDAY (NY, Nassau and Suffolk ed.), Jan. 30,
2003, at A39.
195. Jim Lobe, Activists Slam Bush AIDS Initiative, available at http://www.aegis.com/ne
ws/lps/2002/ip02061 I.html (June 19, 2002) (making a similar point).
196. Stolberg & Stevenson, supra note 189, at A 1.
197. George W. Bush, President Speaks on Fighting Global and Domestic HIV/AIDS,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131-4.html.
198. Mike Allen & Paul Blustein, Unlikely Allies Influenced Bush to Shift Course on AIDS
Relief, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2003, at Al.
199. Id.
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assistance to support HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment is consistent with
the U.S.'s policy of strong patent protection. First, a focus on prevention as a
priority eclipses the need for treatment. The second treatment campaigns are
predicated on buying the expensive antiretrovirals rather than on
manufacturing cheaper generic equivalents to spread the resources to benefit
as many people as possible. Indeed, almost at the same time the
administration was announcing this initiative to increase funding to combat
HIV/AIDS, it had just managed to scuttle a growing consensus at the WTO
on balancing patent protection with consumer interests in the context of
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other similar diseases.200
While at home, the United States has used the foreign assistance it gives
in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic to camouflage the link between its
support for strong patents protection and low access to essential drugs. At
the WTO, the United States has been slowly, but surely, consolidating the
view that poverty, not patents, is the reason that makes drugs unaffordable
and inaccessible to those who need them in developing countries.
IV. PART III: POVERTY - THE LATEST FAD 1N THE U.S.'s POLICY OF
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
A. The Discovery of Poverty: From the IIPE 2000 Study to the Attaran/Lee
Gillespie 2001 Paper
In line with its policy of strong patent protection, the latest explanation
given by the United States for lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs in sub-
Saharan Africa is poverty. 20 1 In its initial submission to the TRIPS Council
regarding a solution to paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, (which left the question of whether countries with no
manufacturing capability could authorize those with manufacturing
capability to make essential drugs that were still under patent available to
address a public health emergency), the USTR relied on the 2001 World
Health Organization's Macroeconomics and Public Health report to argue
that poverty, rather than patents, was the major factor inhibiting access to
"needed medicines at any price." 20 2 The premise of this position is that there
is no necessary relationship between the cost of and access to patented drugs
since millions of Africans with HIV/AIDS could not afford these drugs even
if their prices were substantially lowered. In essence, Africans are too poor
to afford the drugs even if their prices were dramatically lowered.
The first soundings of the move to de-link negligible access to essential
drugs from strong patents protection did not, however, come from the U.S.
administration. Rather, they came from the International Intellectual
200. See Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health, supra note 1I, at 6.
201. Id.
202. Id. The submission further noted that for "any TRIPS-related solution there would still
involve a cost." Id.
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Property Institute, (IPPI), a pro-intellectual property think tank based in
Washington DC that was established in 1999.203 In a report issued in 2000,
IIPI examined the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa in the
context of three other major considerations. First, it analyzed the response of
the international community and in particular, the levels of foreign
assistance provided by western countries such as the United States. 204
Second, it examined the availability of patent regimes across the African
continent. Third, it examined the number of patented HIV/AIDS drugs in
these countries. 20 5 The conclusions of this study seemed rather benign when
compared to subsequent work that built upon this initial work and concluded
that poverty was a primary barrier.20 6 Unlike subsequent work, this 2000 IIPI
report concluded that access to essential drugs involves "numerous and
complex issues, including health care infrastructure, international pricing
mechanisms, financing, debt, tariffs and patents."
20 7
In fact, the report specifically concluded that the TRIPS Agreement was
"not an impediment to the distribution of HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals" for at
least three reasons. 2 8 First, the TRIPS Agreement was not in force in "a
majority of sub-Saharan Africa countries." 20 9 Second, the TRIPS Agreement
"permits sufficient flexibility for countries to avoid negative effects." 210
Third, "most drug companies have not obtained patents widely in Africa."2 11
Hence, rather than elevate poverty as the primary barrier to access of
HIV/AIDS drugs, the report emphasized that the real issue "is that of
adequate financing of the overall health system and the development of
health care infrastructures. '" 21 2 The report therefore remained open for
further research to establish whether or not patents and the TRIPS
203. The IIPI describes itself as "an international developing organization and think tank
dedicated to promoting sustainable economic growth in all countries through the sue of healthy
intellectual property systems .... ." INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, at
http://www.iipi.org (last visited June 10, 2003).
204. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, PATENT PROTECTION AND
ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2000).
205. Id.
206. Lee Gillespie-White, was the Executive Director of IIPI and one of the authors of the
PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Id.
She teamed up with Amir Attaran a year later to write the article that gave poverty the spotlight as
the leading barrier to access to essential medicines. See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa, 286 JAMA 1886,
1886-92 (2001).
207. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, supra note 204, at 2.
208. Id. at 3.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Agreement played any role with regard to access to affordable drugs.
213
Lee Gillespie-White, one of the contributors to the IIPI report, and
Amir Attaran, affiliated with Center for International Development and the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, conducted a further survey
relying on responses from drug companies.2 14 Unlike the 2000 IIPI study,
which examined a number of patented HIV/AIDS drugs alongside donor
funding and availability of patent protections in sub-Saharan Africa, the
Gillespie-White/Attaran study was much narrower, primarily focusing on the
relationship between patents and access to drugs.215 Some of its conclusions
coincided with those of the 2000 IPE study. For example, Gillespie-
White/Attaran study confirmed that patent protection was not extensive in
Africa.2
16
The Gillespie-White/Attaran study also made several assumptions,
particularly regarding the reliability of patent status data from patent holders
and licensees,2 17 concluding that "pharmaceutical research and development
will always require the incentive of patentability in poor countries ...
[since] the entire African pharmaceutical market, at 1.1% is commercially
negligible, as is the market share of antiretroviral drugs sold to the poorest of
the third world. '2 18 The report notes that there are non-patent barriers to
access to antiretrovirals, including insufficient financing, lack of political
will among countries, poor medical care and infrastructure, regulatory
barriers, and high sales taxes and tariffs, among other inhibitions.
219
Perhaps the most significant assumption the paper makes is that the
annual cost of a full regiment of antiretroviral treatment per-patient, per
year, is United States $1,200,220 although they acknowledge prices for some
antiretroviral combinations range anywhere between $350 and $1,000
outside the United States.22' This, the authors conclude, puts treatment out of
reach for many of Africa's economies whose annual health budgets spend $8
or less per person.222 Hence, the conclusion that "even if health budgets were
radically expanded and all waste and corruption banished, Africa's
impoverished economies could never afford more than a few percent of the
cost of treatment and this is true even if antiretroviral drug prices continued
213. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, supra note 204, at 2.
214. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 206, at 1886-92.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1887.
217. Id. at 1887, 1889-90.
218. Id. at 1890.
219. Id.
220. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 206, at 1891.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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to decline significantly, which is unlikely." 223 Gillespie-White and Attaran
therefore conclude that the "extreme dearth of international aid finance,
rather than patents, is most to blame for the lack of antiretroviral treatment
in Africa." 2
24
Since the publication oft the Gillespie-White/Attaran study,
pharmaceutical companies, 22 press reports, and the USTR's office in
particular,2 26 have much more loudly used the legitimacy given to poverty as
a barrier to access to antiretrovirals to distance patents as inhibiting such
access. 22 7 A press report in a South African paper even went so far as to
conclude that "[i]f developing country governments are serious about
resolving the issue [of access to antiretrovirals], they should be encouraging
greater protection of private property, the rule of law and other market-based
reforms." 228 The statement that most supported such a conclusion in the
Gillespie-White/Attaran paper had the caveat that although patents might
create market conditions "in which it could become lucrative to patent
antiretroviral drugs more widely in future," 229 even where patents do exist in
sub-Saharan Africa, there was still a need to have an infusion of foreign
assistance based on the recognition that "countries ought to respect patent
laws, but that patent holders reciprocally supply medicines to the global poor
without profit, but also without loss. ' '230
B. Limits of the Gillespie- White/Attaran Poverty Thesis
There are several limitations inherent in the Gillespie-White/Attaran
thesis. First, Gillespie-White and Attaran make a circular argument. For
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. This endorsement by the pharmaceutical industry is perhaps best exemplified by a press
release issued by PHRMA (the pharmaceutical industry lobby) soon after the Attaran/Gillespie-
White paper. See PHRMA, Health Care in the Developing World: Intellectual Property and Access
to AIDS Drugs, available at http://www.phrma.org/ip.access.aids.drugs.html (last visited June 10,
2003). On Attaran's link to the pharmaceutical company world and his criticism of access to
essential medicines activists and advocates, see Big Pharma's Favorite Academics and Opinion
Makers, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/pharmadefenders.html (last visited August 17,
2002).
226. It is reported that the USTR's office cited the Attaran & Gillespie-White paper at the
Doha Ministerial meeting to make the argument that it was poverty, and not patents, that prevented
access to essential medicines. See E-mail from Asia Russell to the essential medicines listserve of
the Consumer Project on Technology, USTR at TRIPS Council Special Meeting (Sept. 19, 2001),
available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001 -September/001 858.html.
227. See also Julian Morris & Richard Tren, A 'Free Market' Point of View, available at
http://www.pharmaceuticalpatents.com/opinions.asp?ID=13 (last visited May 27, 2003).
228. Julian Morris et al., Patents Not Real Villain in Blocking Access to Drugs, Nov. 9, 2001,
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/bday/content/direct/l,3523,965575-6096-0,00.html (last
visited June 10, 2003).
229. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 206, at 1891.
230. Id.
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example, they find that patents are not a major issue inhibiting access to
antiretrovirals because poverty is a more important factor.231 But, then, they
take for granted that the cost of these drugs is an immovable baseline. It is
implicit in their argument that nothing can be done about the drug prices
other than in terms of increasing donor assistance.232 In essence, the goose
that lays the golden eggs must be protected from governments seeking to
override patent rights. Second, Gillespie-White and Attaran assume that the
only "reciprocal" obligations pharmaceutical companies have towards poor
countries is that of voluntarily reducing prices of expensive antiretrovirals
and no more.233
I have several reservations regarding the aforementioned arguments and
claims advanced by Attaran and Gillespie-White. First, recent research
undertaken by the World Bank demonstrates that the WTO's new
commitments, such as TRIPS, impose expensive implementation costs that
undermine poverty reduction and growth, especially in the least developed
countries. 234 To that extent, the link between lack of access to HIV/AIDS
drugs to poverty, or lack of donor support, must necessarily account for the
fact that the very implementation of new regimes of intellectual property
protection do not positively contribute towards the eradication of poverty,
but rather serve to undermine anti-poverty programs being implemented in
these countries.
In addition, the Gillespie-White & Attaran assumption that adoption of
patent regimes would necessarily create market conditions under which
access to antiretrovirals would be enhanced underestimates the fact that the
economic programs that accompany such shifts in protection of intellectual
property protection also call for contractionary macro-economic policies,
which reduce public spending on areas such health and the imposition of
user-fees. 235 For example, in its 1993 World Development Report entitled
Investing in Health, the World Bank recommended that patients should pay
user fees for health, with the exception of a limited range of essential
services.236 However, the report does not acknowledge that there was a
"disastrous" resurgence of tuberculosis in China in direct and almost
231. Id.
232. Interestingly, Attaran and Gillespie-White noted that "poor countries have only the last
resort of compulsory licensing ... which both TRIPS and the Paris Convention legitimately allow
them to do so." Id. at 1891. However, the authors seem to suggest that compulsory licensing is not
an option until 2005, when the TRIPS Agreement comes into force in developing countries. Id. Even
then, the authors suggest the issue of access would only be restricted to access to new medicines-
presumably those patented after 2005. Id.
233. Id.
234. See J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round
Commitments: The Development Challenge, 24 WORLD ECON. 511 (2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade.
235. For an extensive authoritative expose of such policies, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
236. WORLD BANK, INVESTING IN HEALTH, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 58 (1993).
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immediate response to the reintroduction of user fees for TB tests.237
Evidence shows dramatic declines in hospital visits in countries undertaking
these reforms particularly for pre and anti-natal care, preventative tests and
infant deliveries. 238  In large-scale commercial farming areas, the
introduction of user fees coincided with a 64% drop in patient registration at
health clinics. 239 If such programs have the effect of discouraging the poor to
take preventive steps to avoid tuberculosis, clearly they would have a similar
effect with HIV/AIDS, especially because it is associated with cultural and
social stigma, more so than tuberculosis.
240
Second, there is much that is unknown in countries that have only
recently upgraded their intellectual property systems in conformity with the
WTO's intellectual property rules. Specifically, it is difficult to establish
with certainty whether there have been changes in activity patterns that
affect prices of HIV/AIDS drugs, either upwards or otherwise.241 Such a
determination would be critical since a premise of strong patent protection is
that such protection would create market conditions under which more
research and development would be undertaken to make drugs more readily
available. The difficulty of establishing such activity patterns is evidenced
by the fact that the TRIPS Agreement is not yet formally binding in most of
sub-Saharan Africa until 2005. It is therefore an overstatement to presume
that the adoption of patent regimes would necessarily create market
conditions under which antiretrovirals would be more readily available even
before the TRIPS Agreement is actually implemented. Indeed, Attaran and
Gillespie-White acknowledge that after 2005, patents will likely impede
access to antiretrovirals AIDS medications. 242
In addition, recent research on retail-pricing patterns of patented
antiretrovirals in East Africa shows their actual availability, as opposed to
access, varies greatly from country to country. 243 This, in and of itself,
would make it hard for anyone to conclude, without additional verifiable
evidence, that cost or poverty is as significant an issue barring access to
antiretrovirals given that they are often not even available although patented.
More importantly though, where the drugs were available, there was a wide
237. Marc Epprecht, Investing in Amnesia, or Fantasy and Forgetfullness in the World
Bank's Approach to Healthcare Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, 31 J. DEV. AREAS 337, 343-44
(1997).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 344.
240. For an excellent analysis of the cultural and stigma issues related to the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, see SIDDHARTH DUBE, SEX, LIES AND AIDS (2000).
241. Robert B. Sherwood, Global Prospects for the Role of Intellectual Property in
Technology Transfer, 42 IDEA: J.L. & TECH., 27, 34 (2002).
242. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 206, at 1886-92.
243. See McNeil, supra note 9, at A6.
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price divergence within the region for the same drug.244 For example, for the
same antiretroviral, there was a price divergence of 35-100% between the
lowest and the highest price. 245 This seems rather odd, since such variation
cannot be attributed to variations in per capita income. Further, the same
study found that antiretrovials such as aciclovir and neverapine, were twice
as expensive in Kenya as in Norway,246 and zidovudine was 35% more
expensive in Tanzania than in Norway.247 The conclusions of studies such as
these should serve as a caution to linking poverty to lack of access to drugs
for if pharmaceutical pricing is "about the law of the jungle," price levels,
and not merely poverty, are key to access to these drugs.248 These disparities
mean that a Tanzanian worker would have to earn 500 hours of wages to get
a course of first-line tuberculosis treatment, compared to the one-hour of
wages necessary for a Swiss worker.249 Needless to say, although poverty is
not a static phenomenon, it seems foolhardy to argue that it is the major
deterrent to access when pricing of the drugs does not seem to reflect just the
cost of research and development, but also ancillary and inflated costs that
cannot be justified even under market conditions.250
Third, the premise that the cost of drugs or poverty is as big a factor
inhibiting access to AIDS medications as Gillespie-White & Attaran and
their supporters claim is frighteningly consistent with the non-
responsiveness of Western countries towards humanitarian disasters in
Africa. Indeed, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is not the first time that millions of
Africans have died.251 For example, over 30,000 people lost their lives daily
during the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990's as the world watched.252
Today, 5,000 people die every day in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Nevirapine, which prevents mother to child transmission of the HIV/AIDS virus, costs
$430 per 100 units in Norway (although there is hardly any market for it), and $874 in Kenya, where
the need is desperate. Id.
247. McNeil, supra note 9, at A6.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Profiting From Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go, FAMILIES USA,
July 2002, at 1.
251. See, e.g., IRIN, Kenya: Focus on Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs, available at
http://www.irinnews.org/AIDSreport.asp?ReportlD=1429&SelectRegion:East-Africa (last visited
June 10, 2003) (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs making certain
observations on simple and rather inexpensive ways that the government has failed to take in the
registration of AIDS drugs that might make them more accessible quickly and affordably).
252. Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwanda
Tragedy Happen, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 84-108; Thomas W. Lippman, Albright
Embarks on Africa Tour; She Acknowledges U.S., Allies Mishandled Rwanda Crisis, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 1997, at A28; Lynne Duke, Frustration and Envy Over the West's Rapid Response, WASH.
POST, May 7, 1999, at A31; see also Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism":
Promise or Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L.& POL'Y 153, 163 (1999).
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countless others throughout sub-Saharan Africa die with little or no response
from the West.253 The world has learned to watch tragedy in Africa and do
little or nothing about it. President Clinton's attempts at apologizing for
doing little about the well-publicized genocide in Rwanda when he visited
Kigali for only about an hour says a lot about what needs to change
concerning U.S. foreign policy towards Africa generally, and the HIV/AIDS
epidemic particularly: more than window-dressing and appearances is what
is needed. 254
Fourth, attempts by the Bush administration to address the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in Africa primarily as an issue involving strategic security, state
destabilization, and national economic distress removes the urgency of
dealing with the egregious lack of access to health care, as well as to AIDS
drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a human and not simply a strategic
foreign policy issue. Even with the $15 billion five-year initiative launched
by President Bush, only 2 million in twelve African and two Caribbean
countries of the more than 29 million in need of access to HIV/AIDS care
and support in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, including drugs, will
be serviced. 25 The good news is that those of the 2 million people who will
benefit from treatment under the initiative launched by President Bush will
be a big increase from the fewer than 30,000 people who by the end of 2001
were estimated to be benefiting from antiretroviral drugs in sub-Saharan
Africa. 256
Happily too, advances in access to care and drugs in resource limited
settings make it possible now, more than ever before, to ensure that a larger
number of Africans, who comprise over 70% of those infected globally, 257
are reached.258 The WHO's guidelines, seeking to have a three-in-one pill, 259
together with its treatment guidelines once such drugs are available, are
based on an analogous experience in the United States, where the
introduction of the triple-therapy in 1996 led to a 70% decline in AIDS
253. Nicholas D. Kristof, What Did You Do During the African Holocaust?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2003, at A25.
254. ASSOCIATED PRESS, President Clinton Apologizes (March 25, 1998), available at
http://www.rudyfoto.com/ClintonApology.html.
255. Deb Riechmann, Bush Signs Bill to Help Fight AIDS Abroad, YAHOO NEWS, May 27,
2003, at http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&u=/ap/20030527/ap-on-goprwh/bush_aids.
256. UNAIDS, supra note 28, at 23.
257. Berger, supra note 12 1, at 158.
258. See WHO, 3 Million HIV/AIDS Sufferers Could Receive Anti-Retroviral Therapy by
2005, at http://www.who.int/inf/en/pr-2002-58.html (July 9, 2002).
259. Such a pill could combine AZT (Zidovudine), 3 TC (lamivudine) and a third drug such
as nevirapine, abacavir, or efavirenz depending on the particular patient. John S. James, 'Trizivir'
Approved: Three Existing Drugs in One, 355 AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Nov. 17, 2000, available at
http://www.aegis.com/pubs/atn/2000/ATN35503.html. Other drugs on the WHO's essential drugs
list includes didanosine, indinavir, lopinavir, nelfinar, ritanovir low dose, saquinvir and stavudine.
1d.
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deaths.260 New research and the hope of new drugs also continue to abate
fears of drug resistance.
2 6 1
In addition and quite significantly contrary to the Gillespie-White &
Attaran paper, which together with the Macroeconomics and Health report
discussed below are cited as the leading studies supporting the proposition
that poverty is the largest barrier of access to AIDS drugs, 62 most of the
drugs on patent in Africa are not "practical as first-line treatments" in most
of sub-Saharan Africa because of the need for constant monitoring as well as
cumbersome dietary requirements. 263 Further, the AZT/3TC combination,
which is the "most practical and sought after" treatment, is patented in
thirty-seven out of fifty-three countries while nevirapine, a leading non-
nucleoside used for preventing mother-to-child infection, is patented in
twenty-five out of fifty-three countries. 264 In those countries, the Attaran &
Gillespie-White study, when read against evidence of falling prices of
generic triple-therapies, only confirms the high correlation between patents
for brand-name drugs and high prices, which a more recent study tends to
confirm. 26 5 When the cost of these drugs drops, African employers,
particularly corporations, might be better able to buy them for their
employees with HIV/AIDS.266 In addition, more Africans, as well as
governments in the continent, might extend coverage to more and more
260. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., WHO Moves to Make AIDS Drugs More Accessible to Poor
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at F7.
261. Theresa Agovino, New AIDS Drug Raises Hopes, Fears, (Aug. 22, 2003) available at
http://www.immunecentral.com/templates/info template.cfm/6181/77/31.
262. Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 206, at 1886-92.
263. Press Release, Joint Statement by Oxfam, Treatment Action Campaign, Consumer
Project on Technology (CPT), M6decins Sans Fronti6res (MSF) and Health GAP, Patents Do Matter
in Africa According To NGOs (Oct. 17, 2001), at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/public
ations.asp?scntid = l 71020011428553&contenttype.
264. Id.
265. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Jayashree Watal, Impact of Patents on Access to HIV/AIDS
Drugs in Developing Countries, CENTER FOR INT'L DEV. AT HARV. UNIV. WORKING PAPER No. 92
(May 2002). The article concludes in part:
On the one hand, patents may constrain access to new drugs through less competition
and higher prices. On the other hand, patents may promote access to new therapies by
encouraging innovators to launch new drugs in low and middle-income countries. The
net effect is theoretically ambiguous and, therefore, it is an empirical matter to evaluate.
Our main finding is that patent rights do have a negative effect on unsubsidized access
to HIV/AIDS drugs. Between 1995 and 1999, switching all HIV/AIDS drugs from a
patent regime to a no patent regime would have actually increased access to therapy by
30%. However, we also find that the negative impact of patents on access differs
strongly over time, and across countries with different income levels. Patents hurt
access most in the early period from the date the drug is launched in the US, and in the
countries of our sample with the relatively higher per capital income levels.
Id. at 2.
266. Brook K. Baker, BriefAnalysis of Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for
Economic Development, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-December/0
02547.html (last visited June 10, 2003).
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people since lower prices will stretch foreign assistance and corporate health
programs further since lower drug prices might mean increased volumes of
the drugs would be affordable.
67
Further, until relatively recently, the Bush administration has
equivocated on the AIDS issue. For example, in early February 2001, Bush
Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, announced that the administration would close
the National AIDS policy office opened by President Clinton.268 Soon
thereafter, responding to criticism regarding this move, the administration
announced that it would not close the office and that its commitment to the
HIV/AIDS problem was a focus at the White House, 269 Although this was a
domestic policy office, this early indecision in the administration is also
reflected in its HIV/AIDS policy abroad. In April 2001, when President
Bush announced his new director of the White House Office of National
AIDS Policy, the office's expanded mandate was designated as
incorporating the "international and national security aspects of the
pandemic." 270 In other words, U.S. foreign policy would link its programs
on combating the pandemic to national security. 27' This conceptualization of
the pandemic was rather narrow and myopic since it gave little focus to the
grave human dimensions of the pandemic particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Little wonder then that, on the eve of the Presidential Advisory Council on
HIV/AIDS meeting in mid-March 2002, a coalition of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO) took issue with the administration's record on
addressing the epidemic within the United States. 272 The NGO found the
administration's response lacking in comprehensiveness, coordination,
funding and leadership, even while increasing numbers of U.S. citizens are
getting infected.273 The NGO report noted that the greatest increases in
infection were among African Americans and Latinos, who make up an
267. Id.
268. White House to Keep Offices on AIDS, Race Relations (Feb. 7, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/O7/wh.aids/; Christopher Heredia, White House
AIDS, Race Relations Bloopers: Bush Says Offices Will Stay Open, After Top Aide Said They'd
Close, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2001, at A3.
269. Heredia, supra note 268, at A3.
270. Scott Evertz, U.S. Targets Global AIDS Pandemic, available at http://usinfo.stat
e.gov/journals/itgic/1201/ijge/gj0l.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
271. This seems to be confirmed by the White House in its September 2002 report entitled
THE WHITE HOUSE, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002)
Under Chapter IV, entitled, "Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts," the policy documents
stated in part "[I]n Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate
poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States-preserving human dignity-and our
strategic priority-combating global terror." Id. at 10.
272. AIDS Report Card for the Bush Administration, Submitted by a national coalition of
AIDS organizations, (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/docume
nts/record?record = 1024.
273. Id.
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estimated 70% of new HIV infections.274 Indeed, in the United States, the
NGO report noted that HIV/AIDS was "disproportionately impacting
women of color and men who have sex with men, and increasingly on older
Americans and low-income persons."
275
The WHO's Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, which was
chaired by economist Jeffrey Sachs, has also argued that the United States
can do better by increasing foreign aid to significantly increase access to
HIV/AIDS drugs among other public health goals in developing countries.
276
The report observes that if the United States increased its foreign aid budget
from its current levels of less than one-tenth of 1.1% of the U.S.'s GNP to
two-tenths of 1%, an extra $10 billion would be available for disease
control, primary school education, clean water and other important needs in
developing countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa.277 The report in
essence notes that a tiny share of rich-country income would translate into
eight million lives saved each year in poor countries.278 Should the United
States have the political will to raise its foreign aid budget to such an
amount, it would in turn become a significant bargaining advantage with the
European Union and Japan to get even more money towards this end. As UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan has suggested, the Global AIDS Fund would
need $7 billion from the United States to be effective.2 79 It seems that such a
goal is clearly within the reach of the international community with proper
leadership from the United States.280 The U.S. initiative pledging $15 billion
over five years is a big first step in that direction. Although this is a
significant pledge, it is by no means enough to win the battle against
HIV/AIDS as Jeffrey Sachs noted in response to the initiative.
281
From the perspective that the Bush administration had previously only
promised a mere $500 million to the Global AIDS Fund and had failed to
support Congressional efforts to raise funding levels282 and eventually
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, MACRONOMICS
AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11-12 (2001).
277. Id.
278. COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, WHO, MACROECONOMICS AND
HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001); see also Dan Rather, Why
Do We Sleep as AIDS Epidemic Continues, HOUSTON CHRON. (March 2, 2002), available at
www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.hts/editorial/outlook/1279183; Jimmy Carter & Bill Gates, Sr.,
Pennies a Day Can Stop Spread of AIDS, L.A. TIMES (April 7, 2002), at M5, available at
www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-000024730apr07.story?co.
279. COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, supra note 278.
280. C. Payne Lucas, The Strength to Kill AIDS Lies Within U.S., NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 2002,
at A27.
281. Bush Begins Trip To Five African Countries, U.N. WIRE, July 7, 2003, available at
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030707/449_6231 asp.
282. In early June 2002, President Bush is said to have called Senator Frist, who had
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blocked congress' appropriation of the $500 million, the $15 billion
initiative is very welcome.283 However, like the $500 million initiative,
which was narrowly targeted to fourteen countries and for mother-to-child
transmission, the $15 billion initiative is limited to twelve African and two
Caribbean countries. 284 It is also laced with limitations on condom use as
already noted above. 285 Its long-term viability is also doubtful since it is tied
to the unpredictable cycle of yearly appropriations in Congress. Hopefully,
unlike the miniscule $500 million initiative, 286 the $15 billion initiative will
end the Bush administration's "shell-game" of re-designating existing levels
of bilateral support to please the world, rather than significantly shifting
policy towards addressing the epidemic and to provide leadership on this
issue to the world.287
Finally, one must doubt the Bush administration's commitment to a
global HIV/AIDS policy when pharmaceutical companies are some its
biggest supporters and when the White House and the Republican controlled
House of Representatives and the Senate have stood in the way of legislation
to ensure affordable access to prescription drugs here in the United States.
However, this observation ought to be measured against the fact that in July
2003, the House of Representatives did pass a bill allowing importation of
drugs to address the rising costs of prescription drugs. 288 In addition, we
must not forget that the Bush administration chose to buy out Bayer on the
Ciproflaxacin drug to deal with the bio-terrorist threat related to anthrax.
289
The Bush administration did this in order to avoid compromising its position
on refusing to allow developing countries to use compulsory or parallel
licensing to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 290 In sum, the Bush
proposed increasing levels of U.S. funding to the Global AIDS Fund to $600 million and asked him
to "offer a much lower figure." See Press Release, HEALTH ACTION AIDS (June 7, 2002); Senate
Failure on Global AIDS Fund, available at http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/releas
e060902.html. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist returned from a ten day tour of Africa (the trip took
place August and September, 2003) amidst criticism that he had held back approval of the money
promised by Bush for AIDS in Africa in his 2003 State of the Union address. See HEALTHGAP,
Activists Denounce AIDS Funding Excuses.- Senate Must Act to Fund Promised $3 Billion-with at
least $1 billion for the Global Fund (Sept. I1, 2003), available at http://www.one
world.net/article/view/67265/I/.
283. Press Release, supra note 282.
284. Jim Lobe, Activists Slain Bush AIDS Initiative, INTER PRESS SERVICE (June 19, 2002),
at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2002/IP02061 I.html.
285. Stolberg, supra note 190, at A13.
286. Salih Booker & William Minter, Aid - Let's Get Real, NATION (July 18, 2002),
available at http://www.thenation.com.
287. Salih Booker, Bush Plays Shell Game With African Lives (June 24, 2002), available at
http://www.fpif.org and http://www.africaaction.org.
288. ASSOCIATED PRESS, House Backs Drug Imports to Cut Costs (July 26, 2003), available
at http://www.iht.com/articles/104127.html.
289. HHS PRESS OFFICE, supra note 175.
290. See James Thuo Gathii, Balancing Patent Rights and Affordability of Prescription
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administration, like the Clinton administration before it, has given in
grudgingly and minimally to widening access to HIV/AIDS drugs abroad at
the urging of activists. Presently, the war against Iraq and the unpopularity
of the United States around the world seemed to occasion a rethinking of the
administration's policy on the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. It would seem
that by announcing the $15 billion initiative right before the then impending
attack on Iraq with enormous international disapproval and no U.N. Security
Council authority, the United States was assuaging the international
community under the threat of its diminished stature. Though a welcome
policy shift, the $15 billion initiative is perhaps best understood in this
context. After all, there has been no simultaneous concession made to
weakening the barriers of strong patent protection to access to essential
drugs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
By beating the drumbeat of poverty, pharmaceutical companies and
Western governments, such as the United States, that are opposed to making
exceptions to patent protection to facilitate access to HIV/AIDS drugs to
indigent populations while arguing that this is consistent with the provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement, have sought to marginalize the issue of access to
antiretrovirals by suggesting that solutions lie largely outside the patent
regime. In this context, the world can rest reassured that the thousands who
die of HIV/AIDS every day in sub-Saharan Africa are dying because they
are poor, not because they did not have access to drugs. Yet, the policy of
strong patent protection prevents widespread access of antiretroviral drugs to
treat HIV/AIDS.
Although the direct actions of HIV/AIDS activists targeted towards
leading figures of both the Clinton and Bush administrations, and
notwithstanding the organized efforts of a coalition of developing country
governments at the WTO has led to more humanitarian assistance towards
alleviating the pandemic, the policy of strong patent protection persists. I
have argued that poverty is one of the latest fads that the Bush
administration has begun to deploy, particularly at the WTO, with a view to
distancing the extent to which patents bar access to essential drugs. I have
further demonstrated that there are many reasons to be skeptical about the
emphasis that poverty has received in identifying bottlenecks of access to
antiretrovirals. A major reason for such skepticism is that the poverty fad
distances the attention or focus on patents and pricing in Africa. This is most
evidenced by the fact that although all the members of the WTO
unanimously acceded to the passage of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health,29' which recognized that the TRIPS Agreement contemplates
Drugs in Addressing Bio-Terrorism: An Analysis of In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 651 (2003).
291. Africa: You Talk, We Die, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/Afric
an_Studies/UrgentAction/apic-093003.htm.
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a balance between the rights and interests of consumers and producers of
intellectual property rights, there is yet to be even one instance of a country
in Africa utilizing this flexibility to facilitate access to affordable
antiretrovirals, such as through compulsory licensing. This seems to strongly
suggest that the U.S.'s view of strong patent protection supported by many
TRIPS-plus sanctions, such as section 301, has transformed pharmaceutical
patents into impregnable private property rights. That strong patent
protection, therefore, seems to enjoy an unassailable persistence, even in the
face of one of the most serious public health crises of the last century, in my
view, reflects lopsidedness favoring pharmaceutical profits over the lives of
millions of Africans dying without dignity unnecessarily.
The variety of ways in which patents have been removed from the
equation of access to essential medicines, as exemplified in the inflexibility
of the U.S.'s support of strong patent protection, reflects not only the
asymmetrical nature of power in international relations, but also the
structural power of strong patent protection on the most vulnerable
populations of the global economy. The discourse of charity and
humanitarianism accompanying the uncompromising support of patents at
any cost simply disguises the U.S.'s priorities in ensuring that multinational
pharmaceutical companies acquire markets for their drugs without any threat
to their profitability, even in the face of heart-wrenching human need.
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